Feature/OPED
South Africa Reshapes its Democracy, Shows Readiness for Economic Transformation
By Professor Maurice Okoli
South Africa’s historic election results in late May 2024 were another credible testament which, by simple guiding definition, explicitly illustrated democracy as the aggregate will of the people. It was held as stipulated by its constitution. The diverse political expressions were presented through political parties, the African National Congress (ANC) and its largest rivals the Democratic Alliance (DA), the hard-left Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and uMkhonto weSizwe Party. Minority parties had their chance to participate, which made it fair and free for electoral progress in South Africa.
This is unlike what happened in Nigeria the so-called giant of Africa, where an election process was mired with ballot box snatching, rigging, violence, and irregularities thereby totally undermining the will of the people.
Despite heightened criticisms, South Africa has illuminated an exemplary template of good governance. In most significant practice, adherence of good governance is one fundamental principle that African leaders have to uphold, as a guiding principle combined with transparency and accountability, to shy away from the shame of being accused over functional political irresponsibility.
Worth reiterating that the political initiative taken by the African National Congress, headed by President Cyril Ramaphosa, to form a coalition has set the rhythmical parameters for the evolutionary processes, without much resistance to the obvious glaring weaknesses and shortfalls of the past administration. The creation of the new executive government emboldened the concept of “unity in diversity” and would have to float a common understanding towards ratifying and removing the existing complexities and contradictions within the framework of aspirations stipulated in the constitution. In another context, it has some relevance for the current shifting geopolitical situation and emerging multipolar architecture.
With its chequered history behind it, South Africa needs comprehensive result-oriented development initiatives, and this can only come through striking compromise and consequently be adopted by the coalition government. The political stalwarts such as the Democratic Alliance (DA) and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), now grossly involved in treading the tricky balanced act approved by the parliament on June 14, 2024, raised unswerving hopes for South Africa, the southern African nation of approximately 62 million.
It was a breakthrough to merge political forces marking the ‘great beginning’ of a new chapter, as Economic Freedom Fighters, uMkhonto weSizwe, and other parties have remained antagonistic, and have been termed as the game-losers of the century, marking a significant shift in South African political history after 30 years of ANC dominance. It has some implications, though.
The preceding political agitations culminating in the coalition agreement marked the most significant political change since Nelson Mandela led the ANC to victory in 1994, ending apartheid. “Today is a historic day for our country,” DA leader John Steenhuisen stated, highlighting a new chapter focused on the nation’s interests and future. Similarly acknowledging all these without the least doubts, Ramaphosa described the success as “a remarkable change” and “It will once again be a privilege and pleasure to serve this great nation … (as) president,” said the 71-year-old Ramaphosa, emphasizing a new era of hope and cautious inclusivity. (1)
Tackling Existing Tasks
The newly created executive government would necessarily have to determine the scope of transformation, and the contours for a broader strategic economic resuscitation to uplift South Africa back to its status as Africa’s economic power and an influencer on the global stage, starting from the regional bloc, Southern African Development Community (SADC) and to continental organization, the African Union (AU).
As President Cyril Ramaphosa secured the second term, the preliminary pathway must lead towards tackling the existing pertinent issues that were raised during the election campaign and resulted in a fall of supporters (42%), below the simple majority, for the ANC.
Several reports monitored for this article, the ANC’s decline primarily stemmed from persistent issues such as high poverty, inequality, crime, rolling power cuts, and internal corruption. The DA’s entry into national government signifies a watershed moment for South Africa, as the party advocates for scrapping some of the ANC’s Black empowerment programs, aiming for good governance and a strong economy to benefit all citizens.
Perhaps, South Africa’s newly instituted government has to acknowledge the undeniably challenging future tasks that would require adopting suitable strategies for implementing a set of result-expected policy directions. Across the board, however, experts and investors have already welcomed the coalition, expecting policy continuity and accelerated reforms. It is worth mentioning here that the coalition agreement also outlines priorities, inextricably linked to comprehensive sustainable development, such as economic growth, job creation, land reform, infrastructure development, and fiscal sustainability.
South Africa is the fourth-most populous country in Africa, 80 per cent of the population is black, located entirely south of the equator, after Tanzania. But the most paramount feature is that South Africa has a mixed economy. South Africa’s economy is the most industrialized and technologically advanced in Africa respectively, and has the second largest economy in Africa, after Nigeria. According to research reports, South Africa has a private wealth of $651 billion making its population the richest in Africa followed by Egypt with $307 billion and Nigeria with $228 billion. (2) Despite these, South Africa is still burdened by a relatively high rate of poverty and unemployment and is ranked in the top ten countries in the world.
Unlike most of the world’s industrialized countries, Energy power outrages have bugged down industrial production and domestic utilization. Electricity deficits in an increasing headache across Africa, and the majority of the African countries lack access to this vital component. African Development Bank and African Import-Export Bank reports said half the total of Africa’s population has no daily access to electricity. The impact is considered simply as immeasurable, though surmountable. South Africa is currently the only country on the African continent that possesses a nuclear power plant. The primary electricity generator is Eskom, the utility is the largest producer of electricity in Africa and also needs capital repairs as the equipment is obsolete and experiences frequent breakdowns, consequently limiting the power supply.
Due to severe mismanagement and corruption at Eskom, the company is R392bn ($22bn) in debt and is unable to meet the demands of the South African power grid. Due to this, Eskom implemented load-shedding, which is periodically switching off electricity to specific power grids in specific time frames. In South Africa, load shedding is done to prevent a failure of the entire system when the demand for electricity strains the capacity of Eskom’s power-generating system. Load shedding is characterized by periods of widespread national-level rolling blackouts.
Dr Kelvin Kemm, a nuclear physicist and former chairman of the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (NECSA), and current Chairman of Stratek Global, a nuclear project management company based in Pretoria, suggested in a report that the ultimate pathway forward, possibly the “energy mix” can effectively fill certain functions in electricity provision, but “much financial arm-twisting has taken place, in the forms of supposedly soft loans and other inducements to save mankind from the sins of the Industrial Revolution and modern day industrialists.” (4)
Under former President Jacob Zuma, the power crisis in South Africa steadily worsened, as the authorities tried to make up their minds on which direction to follow, according to Kemm. In reality, Zuma pushed for more nuclear power. However, this initiative was vehemently opposed by anti-nuclear green groups who are significantly funded by the countries exporting their green solutions. Zuma-era project to build an additional 9600 MW of nuclear power was torpedoed by the anti-nuclear greens. Then President Cyril Ramaphosa deposed President Jacob Zuma. A hallmark of the tenure of President Ramaphosa has been dithering and uncertainty. The country hoped for a show of strong leadership under President Ramaphosa, but that did not materialize. Thankfully, South Africa is now advancing the nuclear agenda not only by announcing the planned building of a new large nuclear power station but also by supporting the introduction of Small Modular Reactors.
Combined with the energy question discussed above, South Africa is widely infected by corruption. It scored 41 points out of 100 on the 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index. Notwithstanding that, more examples of corruptible governments are abounding in Africa. Critics noted that African leaders are fond of making unilateral decisions, and bartering natural resources without cabinet approval and parliamentary discussions. And according to critics, Africans consistently blame their poor performance on external factors. Corruption is a global phenomenon, but that socioeconomic cancer should be tackled seriously in South Africa.
Senior Writer Kate Whiting indicated, in her report on Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer, that Corruption is hindering Africa’s economic, political, and social development… More than this, it affects the well-being of individuals, families, and communities.” The report attributed the deterioration of the rule of law and democratic institutions, as well as a rapidly shrinking space for civil society and independent media to corruption in Africa.
Over the years from the apartheid era until today, there has been tremendous growth in multifaceted crimes across South Africa. Reasons could not be far-fetched, as, blacks are unemployed. The entire economy creates highly limited employment places, and again due to porous official policies. From April 2017 to March 2018, on average 57 murders were committed each day in South Africa. More than 526,000 South Africans were murdered from 1994 to 2019. As of February 2023, South Africa unbelievably has the sixth-highest crime rate in the world.
In an article headlined “Coalition Government: A Test For South Africa’s Democracy” published in June 2024, (5) Samir Bhattacharya, a research associate at Observer Research Foundation (ORF) in New Delhi, India, pointed to the possible impact on its future foreign policy and aspects of its implications. Moving forward, the next administration would need to give the country’s foreign policy issues serious attention, chief among them being the delicate balancing act between the West, China, and Russia. At a deeper level, the incoming administration must develop a realistic foreign policy agenda that inspires confidence among investors, both local and foreign. Due to its close ties to all of the superpowers and the BRICS countries, South Africa’s non-alignment approach to international affairs is unlikely to alter in the current environment.
However, there arises a firm need to keep in mind that South Africa still finds strength in its democratic system, which remains a cornerstone of stability and inclusivity. Due to its participation in numerous international issues and membership in groups such as the G20 and BRICS, South Africa is a significant global player. It has lately surpassed Nigeria to become the largest economy on the African continent. South Africa’s latest developments are closely watched not only in the continent but also globally.
Logical Glimpse into the Future
South Africa boasts of an excellent reputation on the global stage. It is also a member of the Southern African Development Community and the African Union. It is a founding member of the AU’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development. After apartheid ended, South Africa was readmitted to the Commonwealth of Nations. Chronicling history, Johannesburg hosted the latest XVI BRICS summit and continues to play a pivotal role in the BRICS association. China supported by Russia, in 2011, South Africa was enrolled into the informal association BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Jacob Zuma asserted that BRICS member countries would also work with each other through the UN, G20, and the India, Brazil South Africa (IBSA) forum.
According to local African and foreign critics, despite its widened bilateral relations with many foreign countries, and yet South Africa suffers from high youth unemployment, grappling with energy supply deficits, and many other economic obstacles discussed earlier in this article. Ramaphosa consistently attributes weak economic performance to external factors. In his speeches after the second inauguration on June 19, 2024, Ramaphosa unswervingly promised to embark on a swift and vigorous economic resuscitation of South Africa, and within the new geopolitical reality. Nonetheless, the past was seemingly a difficult time. Ramaphosa has to ‘walk the talk’ as illustrated by well-coined linguistic phrases to win the hearts of the working-class, entrepreneurs, and middle-class population. The logic behind his re-election and re-appointment signalizes a complete turning point and a new chapter, at first with steadfastness, cooperating and collaborating in a close-knitted manner with the broad coalition and stakeholders in readiness to adopt radical measures in dealing with the existing economic deficiencies, striving further to improve the economic status of South Africa. The new chapter brings in its fold the necessity to make contentious steps toward achieving visible economic progress and ensuring ultimate economic sovereignty, creating an inspiring bright future for the generations as stipulated within the constitution of South Africa.
References
- Official speeches by DA leader John Steenhuisen and ANC Cyril Ramaphosa made available on the websites (June 2024).
- “World Bank: South Africa” (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 20 April 2023.
- Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer, April 2023 report.
- Ramaphosa’s Administration and the Electricity Challenges in South Africa. Dr Kelvin Kemm (May 2024) interview published by Eurasia Review.
- Samir Bhattacharya, Coalition Government: A Test For South Africa’s Democracy (June 2024), interview published by Global Research.
Professor Maurice Okoli is a fellow at the Institute for African Studies and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. He is also a fellow at the North-Eastern Federal University of Russia. He is an expert at the Roscongress Foundation and the Valdai Discussion Club. As an academic researcher and economist with a keen interest in current geopolitical changes and the emerging world order, Maurice Okoli frequently contributes articles for publication in reputable media portals on different aspects of the interconnection between developing and developed countries, particularly in Asia, Africa and Europe. With comments and suggestions, he can be reached via email: [email protected].
Feature/OPED
Why Creativity is the New Infrastructure for Challenging the Social Order
By Professor Myriam Sidíbe
Awards season this year was a celebration of Black creativity and cinema. Sinners directed by Ryan Coogler, garnered a historic 16 nominations, ultimately winning four Oscars. This is a film critics said would never land, which narrates an episode of Black history that had previously been diminished and, at some points, erased.
Watching the celebration of this film, following a legacy of storytelling dominated by the global north and leading to protests like #OscarsSoWhite, I felt a shift. A movement, growing louder each day and nowhere more evident than on the African continent. Here, an energetic youth—representing one-quarter of the world’s population—are using creativity to renegotiate their relationship with the rest of the world and challenge the social norms affecting their communities.
The Academy Awards held last month saw African cinema represented in the International Feature Film category by entries including South Africa’s The Heart Is a Muscle, Morocco’s Calle Málaga, Egypt’s Happy Birthday, Senegal’s Demba, and Tunisia’s The Voice of Hind Rajab.
Despite its subject matter, Wanuri Kahiu’s Rafiki, broke the silence and secrecy around LGBTQ love stories. In Kenya, where same sex relationships are illegal and loudly abhorred, Rafiki played to sold-out cinemas in the country’s capital, Nairobi, showing an appetite for home-grown creative content that challenges the status quo.
This was well exemplified at this year’s World Economic Forum in Davos when alcoholic beverages firm, AB InBev convened a group of creative changemakers and unlikely allies from the private sector to explore new ways to collaborate and apply creativity to issues of social justice and the environment.
In South Africa, AB inBev promotes moderation and addresses alcohol-related gender-based violence by partnering with filmmakers to create content depicting positive behaviours around alcohol. This strategy is revolutionising the way brands create social value and serve society.
For brands, the African creative economy represents a significant opportunity. By 2030, 10 per cent of global creative goods are predicted to come from Africa. By 2050, one in four people globally will be African, and one in three of the world’s youth will be from the continent.
Valued at over USD4 trillion globally (with significant growth in Africa), these industries—spanning music, film, fashion, and digital arts—offer vital opportunities for youth, surpassing traditional sectors in youth engagement.
Already, cultural and creative industries employ more 19–29-year-olds than any other sector globally. This collection of allies in Davos understood that “business as usual” is not enough to succeed in Africa; it must be on terms set by young African creatives with societal and economic benefits.
The key question for brands is: how do we work together to harness and support this potential? The answer is simple. Brands need courage to invest in possibilities where others see risk; wisdom to partner with those others overlook; and finally, tenacity – to match an African youth that is not waiting but forging its own path.
As the energy of the creative sector continues to gain momentum, I am left wondering: which brands will be smart enough to get involved in our movement, and who has what it takes to thrive in this new world?
Professor Sidíbe, who lives in Nairobi, is the Chief Mission Officer of Brands on a Mission and Author of Brands on a Mission: How to Achieve Social Impact and Business Growth Through Purpose.
Feature/OPED
Why President Tinubu Must End Retirement Age Disparity Between Medical and Veterinary Doctors Now
By James Ezema
To argue that Nigeria cannot afford policy inconsistencies that weaken its already fragile public health architecture is not an exaggeration. The current disparity in retirement age between medical doctors and veterinary professionals is one such inconsistency—one that demands urgent correction, not bureaucratic delay.
The Federal Government’s decision to approve a 65-year retirement age for selected health professionals was, in principle, commendable. It acknowledged the need to retain scarce expertise within a critical sector. However, by excluding veterinary doctors and veterinary para-professionals—whether explicitly or by omission—the policy has created a dangerous gap that undermines both equity and national health security.
This is not merely a professional grievance; it is a structural flaw with far-reaching consequences.
At the heart of the issue lies a contradiction the government cannot ignore. For decades, Nigeria has maintained a parity framework that places medical and veterinary doctors on equivalent footing in terms of salary structures and conditions of service. The Consolidated Medical Salary Structure (CONMESS) framework recognizes both professions as integral components of the broader health ecosystem. Yet, when it comes to retirement policy, that parity has been abruptly set aside.
This inconsistency is indefensible.
Veterinary professionals are not peripheral actors in the health sector—they are central to it. In an era defined by zoonotic threats, where the majority of emerging infectious diseases originate from animals, excluding veterinarians from extended service retention is not only unfair but strategically reckless.
Nigeria has formally embraced the One Health approach, which integrates human, animal, and environmental health systems. But policy must align with principle. It is contradictory to adopt One Health in theory while sidelining a core component of that framework in practice.
Veterinarians are at the frontline of disease surveillance, outbreak prevention, and biosecurity. They play critical roles in managing threats such as anthrax, rabies, avian influenza, Lassa fever, and other zoonotic diseases that pose direct risks to human populations. Their contribution to safeguarding the nation’s livestock—estimated in the hundreds of millions—is equally vital to food security and economic stability.
Yet, at a time when their relevance has never been greater, policy is forcing them out prematurely.
The workforce realities make this situation even more alarming. Nigeria is already grappling with a severe shortage of veterinary professionals. In some states, only a handful of veterinarians are available, while several local government areas have no veterinary presence at all. Compelling experienced professionals to retire at 60, while their medical counterparts remain in service until 65, will only deepen this crisis.
This is not a theoretical concern—it is an imminent risk.
The case for inclusion has already been made, clearly and responsibly, by the Nigerian Veterinary Medical Association and the Federal Ministry of Livestock Development. Their position is grounded in logic, policy precedent, and national interest. They are not seeking special treatment; they are demanding consistency.
The current circular, which limits the 65-year retirement age to clinical professionals in Federal Tertiary Hospitals and excludes those in mainstream civil service structures, is both administratively narrow and strategically flawed. It fails to account for the unique institutional placement of veterinary professionals, who operate largely outside hospital settings but are no less critical to national health outcomes.
Policy must reflect function, not merely location.
This is where decisive leadership becomes imperative. The responsibility now rests squarely with Bola Ahmed Tinubu to address this imbalance and restore coherence to Nigeria’s health and civil service policies.
A clear directive from the President to the Office of the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation can correct this anomaly. Such a directive should ensure that veterinary doctors and veterinary para-professionals are fully integrated into the 65-year retirement framework, in line with existing parity policies and the realities of modern public health.
Anything less would signal a troubling disregard for a sector that plays a quiet but indispensable role in national stability.
This is not just about fairness—it is about foresight. Public health security is interconnected, and weakening one component inevitably weakens the entire system.
Nigeria stands at a critical juncture, confronted by complex health, food security, and economic challenges. Retaining experienced veterinary professionals is not optional; it is essential.
The disparity must end—and it must end now.
Comrade James Ezema is a journalist, political strategist, and public affairs analyst. He is the National President of the Association of Bloggers and Journalists Against Fake News (ABJFN), National Vice-President (Investigation) of the Nigerian Guild of Investigative Journalists (NGIJ), and President/National Coordinator of the Not Too Young To Perform (NTYTP), a national leadership development advocacy group. He can be reached via email: [email protected] or WhatsApp: +234 8035823617.
Feature/OPED
N4.65 trillion in the Vault, but is the Real Economy Locked Out?
By Blaise Udunze
Following the successful conclusion of the banking sector recapitalisation programme initiated in March 2024 by the Central Bank of Nigeria, the industry has raised N4.65 trillion. No doubt, this marks a significant milestone for the nation’s financial system as the exercise attracted both domestic and foreign investors, strengthened capital buffers, and reinforced regulatory confidence in the banking sector. By all prudential measures, once again, it will be said without doubt that it is a success story.
Looking at this feat closely and when weighed more critically, a more consequential question emerges, one that will ultimately determine whether this achievement becomes a genuine turning point or merely another financial milestone. Will a stronger banking sector finally translate into a more productive Nigerian economy, or will it be locked out?
This question sits at the heart of Nigeria’s long-standing economic contradiction, seeing a relatively sophisticated financial system coexisting with weak industrial output, low productivity, and persistent dependence on imports truly reflects an ironic situation. The fact remains that recapitalisation, by design, is meant to strengthen banks, enhancing their ability to absorb shocks, manage risks and support economic growth. According to the apex bank, the programme has improved capital adequacy ratios, enhanced asset quality, and reinforced financial stability. Under the leadership of Olayemi Cardoso, there has also been a shift toward stricter risk-based supervision and a phased exit from regulatory forbearance.
These are necessary reforms. A stable banking system is a prerequisite for economic development. However, the truth be told, stability alone is not sufficient because the real test of recapitalisation lies not in stronger balance sheets, but in how effectively banks channel capital into productive economic activity, sectors that create jobs, expand output and drive exports. Without this transition, recapitalisation risks becoming an exercise in financial strengthening without economic transformation.
Encouragingly, early signals from industry experts suggest that the next phase of banking reform may begin to address this long-standing gap. Analysts and practitioners are increasingly pointing to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as a key destination for recapitalisation inflows, which is a fact beyond doubt. Given that SMEs account for over 70 per cent of registered businesses in Nigeria, the logic is compelling. With great expectation, as has been practicalised and established in other economies, a shift in credit allocation toward this segment could unlock job creation, stimulate domestic production, and deepen economic resilience. Yet, this expectation must be balanced with reality. Historically, and of huge concern, SMEs have received only a marginal share of total bank credit, often due to perceived risk, lack of collateral, and weak credit infrastructure.
Indeed, Nigeria’s broader financial intermediation challenge remains stark. Even as the giant of Africa, private sector credit stands at roughly 17 per cent of GDP, and this is far below the sub-Saharan African average, while SMEs receive barely 1 per cent of total bank lending despite contributing about half of GDP and the vast majority of employment. These figures underscore the structural disconnect between the banking system and the real economy. Recapitalisation, therefore, must be judged not only by the strength of banks but by whether it meaningfully improves this imbalance.
Nigeria’s economic challenge is not merely one of capital scarcity; it is fundamentally a problem of low productivity. Manufacturing continues to operate far below capacity, agriculture remains largely subsistence-driven, and industrial output contributes only modestly to GDP. Despite decades of banking sector expansion, credit to the real sector has remained limited relative to the size of the economy. Instead, banks have often gravitated toward safer and more profitable avenues such as government securities, treasury instruments, and short-term trading opportunities.
This is not irrational. It reflects a rational response to risk, policy signals, and market realities. However, it has created a structural imbalance in which capital circulates within the financial system without sufficiently reaching the productive economy. The result is a pattern where financial sector growth outpaces real sector development, a phenomenon widely described as financialisation without productivity gains.
At the centre of this challenge is the issue of credit allocation. A recapitalised banking sector, strengthened by new capital and improved buffers, should theoretically expand lending. But this is, contrarily, because the more important question is where that lending will go. Will Nigerian banks extend long-term credit to manufacturers, finance agro-processing and value chains, and support scalable SMEs, or will they continue to concentrate on low-risk government debt, prioritise foreign exchange-related gains, and maintain conservative lending practices in the face of macroeconomic uncertainty? Some of these structural questions call for immediate answers from policymakers.
Some industry voices are optimistic that the expanded capital base will translate into a broader loan book, increased investment in higher-risk sectors, and improved product offerings for depositors; this is not in doubt. There are also expectations that banks will scale operations across the continent, leveraging stronger balance sheets to expand their regional footprint. Yes, they are expected, but one thing that must be made known is that optimism alone does not guarantee transformation. The fact is that without deliberate incentives and structural reforms, capital may continue to flow toward low-risk assets rather than high-impact sectors.
Beyond lending, experts are also calling for a shift in how banking success is measured. The next phase of reform, according to the experts in their arguments, must move from capital thresholds to customer outcomes. This includes stronger consumer protection frameworks, real-time complaint management systems and more transparent regulatory oversight. A more technologically driven supervisory model, one that allows regulators to monitor customer experiences and detect systemic risks early, could play a critical role in strengthening trust and accountability within the system.
This dimension is often overlooked but deeply significant. A banking system that is well-capitalised but unresponsive to customer needs risks undermining public confidence. True financial development is not only about capital strength but also about accessibility, fairness, and service quality. Nigerians must feel the impact of recapitalisation not just in improved financial ratios, but in better banking experiences, more inclusive services, and greater economic opportunity.
The recapitalisation exercise has also attracted notable foreign participation, signalling confidence in Nigeria’s banking sector. However, confidence in banks does not necessarily translate into confidence in the broader economy. The truth is that foreign investors are typically drawn to strong regulatory frameworks, attractive returns, and market liquidity, though the facts are that these factors make Nigerian banks appealing financial assets; it must be made explicitly clear that they do not automatically reflect confidence in the country’s industrial base or productivity potential.
This distinction is critical. An economy can attract capital into its financial sector while still struggling to attract investment into productive sectors. When this happens, growth becomes financially driven rather than fundamentally anchored. The risk, therefore, is that recapitalisation could deepen Nigeria’s financial markets, but what benefits or gains when banks become stronger or liquid without addressing the structural weaknesses of the real economy.
It is clear and explicit that the current policy direction of the CBN reflects a strong emphasis on stability, with tightened supervision, improved transparency, and stricter prudential standards. These measures are necessary, particularly in a volatile global environment. However, there is an emerging concern that stability may be taking precedence over growth stimulation, which should also be a focal point for every economy, of which Nigeria should not be left out of the equation. Central banks in emerging markets often face a delicate balancing act, and this is putting too much focus on stability, which can constrain credit expansion, while too much emphasis on growth can undermine financial discipline, as this calls for a balance.
In Nigeria’s case, the question is whether sufficient mechanisms exist to align banking sector incentives with national productivity goals. Are there enough incentives to encourage long-term lending, sector-specific financing, and innovation in credit delivery? Or does the current framework inadvertently reward risk aversion and short-term profitability?
Over the past two decades, it has been a herculean experience as Nigeria’s economic trajectory suggests a growing disconnect between the financial sector and the real economy. Banks have become larger, more sophisticated and more profitable, yet the irony is that the broader economy continues to struggle with high unemployment, low industrial output, and limited export diversification. This divergence reflects the structural risk of financialization, a condition in which financial activities expand without a corresponding increase in real economic productivity.
If not carefully managed, recapitalisation could reinforce this trend. With more capital at their disposal, banks may simply scale existing business models, expanding financial activities that generate returns without contributing meaningfully to production. The point is that this is not solely a failure of the banking sector; it is a systemic issue shaped by policy design, regulatory priorities, and market incentives, which needs the urgent attention of policymakers.
Meanwhile, for recapitalisation to achieve its intended purpose and truly work, it must be accompanied by a deliberate shift or intentional policy change from capital accumulation to productivity enhancement and the economy to produce more goods and services efficiently. This begins with creating stronger incentives for real sector lending with differentiated capital requirements based on sector exposure, credit guarantees for high-impact industries, and interest rate support for priority sectors, which can encourage banks to channel funds into productive areas, and this must be driven and implemented by the apex bank to harness the gains of recapitalisation.
This transformative process is not only saddled with the CBN, but the Development finance institutions also have a critical role to play in de-risking long-term investments, making it easier for commercial banks to participate in financing projects that drive economic growth. At the same time, one of the missing pieces that must be taken into cognisance is that regulatory frameworks should discourage excessive concentration in risk-free assets. No doubt, banks thrive in profitability, as government securities remain important; overreliance on them can crowd out private sector credit and limit economic expansion.
Innovation in financial products is equally essential. Traditional lending models often fail to meet the needs of SMEs and emerging industries, as this has continued to hinder growth. Banks must explore new approaches, including digital lending platforms, supply chain financing, and blended finance solutions that can unlock new growth opportunities, while they extend their tentacles by saturating the retail space just like fintech.
Accountability must also be embedded in the system. One fact is that if recapitalisation is justified as a tool for economic growth, then its outcomes and gains must be measurable and not obscure. Increased credit to productive sectors, higher industrial output and job creation should serve as key indicators of success. Without such metrics, the exercise risks being judged solely by financial indicators rather than its real economic impact.
The completion of the recapitalisation programme represents more than a regulatory achievement; it is a defining moment for Nigeria’s economic future. The country now has a banking sector that is better capitalised, more resilient, and more attractive to investors. These are important gains, but they are not ends in themselves.
The ultimate objective is to build an economy that is productive, diversified, and inclusive. Achieving this requires more than strong banks; it requires banks that actively power economic transformation.
The N4.65 trillion recapitalisation is a significant step forward. It strengthens the foundation of Nigeria’s financial system and enhances its capacity to support growth. However, capacity alone is not enough and truly not enough if the gains of recapitalisation are to be harnessed to the latter. What matters now is how that capacity is deployed.
Some of the critical questions for urgent attention are as follows: Will banks rise to the challenge of financing Nigeria’s productive sectors, particularly SMEs that form the backbone of the economy? Will policymakers create the right incentives to ensure credit flows where it is most needed? Will the financial system evolve from a focus on profitability to a broader commitment to the economic purpose of fostering a more productive Nigerian economy and the $1 trillion target?
The above questions are relevant because they will determine whether recapitalisation becomes a catalyst for change or a missed opportunity if not taken into cognisance. A well-capitalised banking sector is not the destination; it is the starting point. The real journey lies in building an economy where capital works, productivity rises, and growth becomes both sustainable and inclusive.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: [email protected]
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