Feature/OPED
Geopolitical Changes, African Union Reforms and Election of Next AU Commission’s Chairperson
By Professor Maurice Okoli
The African Union, a continental organisation, is heading for a new traditional face within the framework of its guiding principles. That new forthcoming era would open a new chapter and, to a large degree, determine the future of Africa, especially taking cognizance of the current global changes. In less than a year since the expiration of the African Union Chairperson’s position, an advanced search for the next candidate has begun. As stipulated by the organization’s constitution, the candidate for the powerful position is normally elected. It is tentatively planned to choose the fifth Chairperson to succeed incumbent Chairperson Moussa Faki, whose second term of office ends in February 2025.
The majority of African leaders have spoken of unprecedented reforms, carrying out a significant internal shake-up, and new blood to be pumped into the current African Union leadership and its related allied institutions. Arguments for several changes are necessary to make the continental organisation work more effectively and produce tangible results, especially now within the context of global reconfiguration. Africa is too diverse to fit together. But there are many more interests in uniting the continent. But the political, economic, and cultural diversities have to be transformed into continental strength to ensure development and growth, instead of a noticeable display of weaknesses and passive actions. It is often repeatedly claimed that the African Union needs urgent realistic reforms and some kind of rebranding of its structure as an effective instrument for rapid development, new economic architecture, and substantial growth.
In late January, Rwandan President Paul Kagamé was appointed to lead the AU institutional reform process. It was an important step towards implementing its institutional reforms, setting the Pan-African organisation’s objectives under the leadership of the Heads of State, who meet once a year at the Assembly. As Africa faces a multitude of crises, unstoppable debates have also dominated inside Africa and on international platforms over the performance of the 55-member organisation, its existing challenges, and the way forward in the fast-changing world.
A media report released on March 3, 2024, titled “Museveni Endorses Raila Odinga’s AU Chairperson Bid” and circulated in the East African region showed the publicity campaign and erratic steps taken to promote Kenyan Raila Odinga to take over as Chairman of the AU Commission. Interestingly, Raila Odinga, Kenya’s opposition leader, has readily accepted Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni’s endorsement of his candidature for African Union Commission chairperson.
In a flagship statement posted via his social media platforms, Odinga said Museveni endorsed him during a joint meeting with President William Ruto. The Azimio alliance’s leader stated that the joint meeting with President Museveni and President Ruto was organized at the Ugandan president’s invitation.
“I accepted an invitation from President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni of Uganda for a joint meeting with President William Samoei Ruto. President Museveni strongly endorsed my candidature for Chairperson of the African Union Commission,” said Odinga, showing appreciation for William Ruto for fully supporting his candidature.
The trio also discussed the AU platform for deepening regional integration within the East African Community. Apart from Presidents Ruto and Museveni, other state heads who threw their invaluable weight behind the former Prime Minister are Samia Suluhu (Tanzania), Cyril Ramaphosa (South Africa), Salva Kiir (South Sudan), and Felix Tshisekedi of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo also endorsed Odinga, saying he is the best candidate to replace the outgoing chair, Moussa Faki.
Raila Odinga has an unmistakable political influence. He was born into a modest political family and grew up in politics. His profound perspectives suggest he operates as a pivotal figure within power dynamics, and his decision-making capacity is perceived as absolutely pragmatic. Odinga, most observers say, possesses an assertive leadership style and always expresses a steadfast interest in the complexity of a development-oriented society. These leadership skills echo his deep-seated affection for a genuine communal, regional, and continental tradition. Odinga as a suitable candidate underscores the perfect choice to embrace and settle for the best administrator for Africa.
Nevertheless, an insight into the choice and nomination of possible candidates is fraught with intrigue and nepotism. But at a glance, Odinga envisions carving out a new, distinctive image for the African Union. His high-value knowledge and experiences, corporate business entrepreneurialism, and pragmatic new economic development thinking would probably save Africa. Narratives too indicated that Odinga would adopt a far-reaching overhauled approach and take unshakable measures towards the most significant issues across Africa. These are essential conditions for re-imaging the AU’s future.
As the history of the stipulated procedures indicates, the elected chairperson becomes the head of the African Union Commission. For instance, on January 30, 2017, after seven rounds of voting, Chad’s Moussa Faki Mahamat was elected chairperson over Nigeria’s Amina Mohamed. He was re-elected in 2021 for another four-year term, which ends in 2025. Moussa Faki Mahamat, born on June 21, 1960, was first elected as the African Union Commission (AUC) Chairperson on January 30, 2017, and assumed office in March 2017. He served previously as State Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Republic of Chad.
According to official documents researched, the Chairperson of the AUC is the Chief Executive Officer, the legal representative of the AU, and the Commission’s Chief Accounting Officer. The Chairperson of the Commission is elected by the Assembly for a four-year term, renewable once.
In broad terms, the Chairperson’s functions include overall responsibility for the Commission’s administration and finances; promoting and popularising the AU’s objectives and enhancing its performance; consulting and coordinating with key stakeholders like member states, development partners, and Regional Economic Communities (RECs); appointing and managing the Commission’s staff; and acting as a depository for all AU and OAU treaties and legal instruments.
The African Union (AU) under Moussa Faki Mahamat has made several achievements, including raising the continental external relations profile and its ascension into the Group of Twenty (G20). In September 2023, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India chaired the G20 summit, the G20 nations agreed to grant the African Union permanent membership status in an appreciable move aimed at offering the continent a stronger voice on important questions and to uplift its status on a higher stage. In its final declaration in New Delhi, the G20 granted the African Union full membership. The G20 consists of 19 countries and the European Union, making up about 85 percent of the global GDP and two-thirds of the world’s population.
New Delhi is also counting on earning high-profile PR points to burnish its reputation as a Global South leader. In an article published in Indian and foreign newspapers ahead of the summit, Modi wrote, “Our presidency has not only seen the largest-ever participation from African countries but has also pushed for the inclusion of the African Union as a permanent member of the G20.”
Under Moussa Mahamat’s African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the single continental market has the potential to unite an estimated 1.4 billion people in a $2.5 trillion economic bloc. The AfCFTA opens up tremendous opportunities for both local African and foreign investors from around the world.
January 1, 2021, signaled the commencement of Africa’s journey to market integration after it was postponed by six months in 2020 following the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic. But its huge potential, which cannot be underestimated, is to generate a range of benefits through supporting trade creation, structural transformation, productive employment, and poverty reduction.
It aims at making Africa the largest common market in the world and accelerating continental integration. It is expected to reinforce the measures taken in terms of the free movement of persons, goods, and services across borders. But much depends on the collective determination and solidarity demonstrated by African leaders to face the challenges in a united and resolute manner. It depends on the strong mobilization of African leaders and the effective coordination provided by the African Union.
For this to be successful, Africa has to engage in modernising agriculture and strengthening agro-food systems by working towards its food security rather than simply accepting food packages as ‘gifts’ from so-called external friends. The next stage is to industrialise, add value to the agricultural products by processing them, and finally distribute them locally and for exports, hence the establishment of the AfCFTA. From this concrete perspective will emerge a new Africa, “the Africa we want,” which has understandably become the resounding guiding slogan.
Despite that, there have also been several critical assessments and careful analyses of developments over the past few years. The AU has made scathing remarks on the negative impacts inflicted by imperialism, neocolonialism, and Western hegemony. And further consistently called for calling for a complete overhaul of the multinational financial system to enable the pursuit of needed development goals across Africa. Paradoxically, Africa has huge resources, both natural and human, but the larger size of its population still lives in abject poverty and desperation.
At least a majority of African leaders on their side recognised the need to reform the continental organisation too. It has allegedly been manipulated by external powers, and to a large extent, internal deficiencies and weaknesses are still persistent on the continent. These include the absence of the fundamentals of democracy, good governance, transparency, and accountability, primarily due to weak institutions and ineffective organs of the state, especially the parliaments. Opposition groups are stifled, putting democracy at risk across Africa.
Rising ethnic conflicts, political-economic instability, and military appearance in politics. These have sparked widespread mass protests. Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Gabon, Mali, and Niger are run by military officers. Then there was instability in Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The biggest vulnerabilities include the proliferation of weapons, weak border control, and unprotected industrial facilities. The inevitable impact on the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals.
Researchers say the African Union should dedicate this year to solving the various issues of instability and restoring credibility in the democratic process. Non-constitutional changes of government have multiplied in total defiance of the entire political and legal system on which the organization was founded. Never since the creation of the African Union has there been such a large number of transitions following unconstitutional changes of government in Africa. (See African Leaders Extraordinary Summit report, February 2024.)
Set up more than two decades ago, the 55-member bloc has long been criticized for being ineffectual and for taking little decisive action in the face of numerous power grabs. Some 19 presidential or general elections are scheduled on the continent in 2024, portending more challenges for the AU.
Seemingly, there is a necessity to navigate a new dynamic development paradigm within the context of multipolar relations. The multifaceted nature of obstacles has to be addressed with a spirit of vigour and valuable perspectives. There are three main directions: democracy and good governance, food security and industrialization, and economy and trade. These could lead to social inclusion and broadening employment for the youth and the next generation. They could also lead to economic growth, stability, and better life conditions across Africa. All aspects of Africa’s development are incorporated into the joint report published at the African Economic Conference 2022.
In a nutshell, the African Union and African leaders have to realign their foreign policies and back away from geopolitical insinuations, rather than take advantage of the complexities and confrontations to look for substantive opportunities to support their efforts in pursuit of building better. The beauty of Africa lies not only in its economic potential but also in its vibrant and diverse cultures.
However, it would be remiss to discuss Africa’s economic growth without addressing the challenges that persist. Poverty, inequality, and a lack of infrastructure continue to hinder progress. It is our collective responsibility to work towards addressing these issues, ensuring that the benefits of Africa’s economic growth are inclusive and sustainable.
Notwithstanding the questions raised above, Moussa Faki Mahamat has spoken of “worrying trends” during these past few years at high-level conferences and meetings, characterising the main challenges “as political instability, climate change, poverty, deficits in economic governance, and marginalisation of women and young people in development and leadership.” Another major subject of discussion has been how the AU will transition to relying on African states to fund most of its budget rather than foreign donors. For instance, the UN Security Council in December adopted a resolution to finance AU-led peace missions but capped it at 75 percent of the budget.
The 37th AU Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, at the annual convention in February 2024, stressed the necessity for practical long-term strategies and to strengthen efforts at achieving peace and stability on the continent and to attain the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and AU Agenda 2063. The AU Agenda 2063 is a comprehensive development framework for Africa.
The significant aspect of the retreat was the valuable discussions on the reform agenda. The reform agenda emphasises the need to focus on key priorities with a continental scope, realigning AU institutions to deliver on its objectives, operational efficiency, and sustainable self-financing of the Union. The retreat also reviewed the second ten-year plan of Agenda 2063, which spans from 2024 to 2033.
In the context of a multipolar geopolitical order, African leaders and the African Union should strengthen their positions regarding external partnerships. The African Union has to take up the task of developing collective approaches to the problems of maintaining peace and security, strengthening democratic processes, developing human potential, and ensuring socio-economic growth. If not, the continent risks being left behind and used as a pawn in an increasingly divided global order.
The African Union has, in a parallel direction, spearheaded Africa’s development and integration in close collaboration with African Union Member States, the Regional Economic Communities, and African citizens. The AU’s vision is to accelerate progress towards an integrated, prosperous, and inclusive Africa, at peace with itself, playing a dynamic role in the continental and global arenas, effectively driven by an accountable, efficient, and responsive Commission. These are incorporated into a single continental development program referred to as the AU Agenda 2063.
Professor Maurice Okoli is a fellow at the Institute for African Studies and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. He is also a fellow at the North-Eastern Federal University of Russia. He is an expert at the Roscongress Foundation and the Valdai Discussion Club.
As an academic researcher and economist with a keen interest in current geopolitical changes and the emerging world order, Maurice Okoli frequently contributes articles for publication in reputable media portals on different aspects of the interconnection between developing and developed countries, particularly in Asia, Africa, and Europe. With comments and suggestions, he can be reached via email: markolconsult (at) gmail (dot) com.
By Blaise Udunze
Daily, the world watches Nigeria through a familiar lens in what appears to be a gory situation. Especially in cases when the news headlines tell stories of farmer-herder clashes, bandit attacks, kidnappings, villages reduced to ashes or deserted by the dwellers, as thousands of Nigerians have been displaced across states such as Zamfara, Plateau, Benue, Niger, Kaduna and Nasarawa. Subliminally, this is about to become a similarly ugly occurrence in southwestern Nigeria, which is fast becoming obvious if not nipped in the bud quickly.
Recorded data have shown that bandits, Boko Haram, and others killed over 190,000 Nigerians in 17 years and displaced 3.7 million people.
A human rights organisation, the International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law (Intersociety), in its fearful revelation, has said that no fewer than 190,150 Nigerians have been killed by bandits, Boko Haram insurgents, and suspected armed herdsmen between July 2009 and March 19, 2026, as this calls for concern.
The dominant explanations often point to ethnic tensions, religious divisions, climate change, shrinking grazing routes or weak security institutions. No doubt, those factors are certainly part of Nigeria’s complex security crisis. Yet another question deserves serious examination.
What if, in some locations, the violence is also serving another purpose? What if some of the territories experiencing repeated displacement are the same places sitting atop some of Nigeria’s most valuable mineral deposits? More importantly, if such a pattern exists, who benefits when communities disappear?
Of a truth, these questions are uncomfortable, but undeniably they deserve careful investigation rather than dismissal.
For ages, Nigeria has been naturally endowed, and it is estimated to be rich in enormous significant reserves of gold, lithium, uranium, tin, columbite and other strategic minerals increasingly sought after in the global transition to clean energy technologies. As international demand for battery minerals continues to rise, these resources have become far more valuable than they were only a decade ago.
If one overlays publicly available geological information with maps showing persistent violence, some observers argue that striking geographical overlaps appear in several regions. Such overlaps alone cannot establish causation. Correlation is not proof of conspiracy. However, they raise questions worthy of independent scrutiny.
One issue attracting increasing attention and adequately yearns for answer is whether prolonged insecurity may inadvertently or deliberately create conditions that make mineral extraction easier.
Under Nigeria’s Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act 2007, mineral resources belong to the Federal Government, while mining rights are granted through licences and leases. Community engagement and land access are expected to form part of the licensing process, although implementation varies depending on circumstances. This raises an important policy question.
What happens when the communities expected to participate in those processes have already fled because of violence?
Displacement changes the dynamics of land ownership, consent and access. While no evidence automatically proves that attacks are orchestrated to facilitate mining, the sequence of violence followed by renewed commercial activity in some locations deserves closer examination by regulators, lawmakers and investigative journalists.
In conflict studies, researchers have long observed that wars often generate economic winners alongside humanitarian losers. Could elements of Nigeria’s insecurity also be producing economic beneficiaries?
Reports over the years have documented concerns about illegal mining operations across parts of northern Nigeria. Government agencies themselves have repeatedly acknowledged that criminal networks profit from the country’s vast mineral wealth. The unresolved question is whether isolated criminality has, in some instances, evolved into more sophisticated alliances involving political influence, financial interests and international supply chains. If so, the implications extend far beyond Nigeria.
Invariably, it is clearly known that lithium has become one of the world’s most strategic commodities, powering electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy storage systems. Gold has always remained one of the safest global investment assets during periods of uncertainty. Meanwhile, it is well confirmed that the global appetite for these minerals creates enormous financial incentives.
Suppose violent displacement reduces resistance to extraction. Suppose shell companies subsequently acquire mining interests. Suppose minerals then leave Nigeria through legitimate-looking export documentation while their true value remains understated.
These scenarios remain allegations unless supported by verifiable evidence. Yet they outline a framework that investigators may wish to test rather than ignore. Financial crime experts frequently identify trade mis-invoicing as one of the most common methods of illicit financial flows worldwide.
Could Nigeria’s solid minerals sector be vulnerable to similar practices? If valuable lithium ore is deliberately but inaccurately described as lower-value material on export documents, substantial wealth could potentially leave the country without reflecting its true market value. Likewise, if unrefined gold exits through privileged channels with limited scrutiny, questions naturally arise about oversight, transparency and accountability over criminal activities which have continued to stunt and disrupt the country’s socio-economic growth and at the same time cause carnage.
Such possibilities are not accusations against any particular institution or company. Rather, they illustrate why stronger monitoring systems are increasingly essential. Another question concerns logistics.
With the high level of criminal activities, industrial mining requires heavy machinery, diesel supplies, transportation networks and specialised personnel. These are not operations that can remain invisible indefinitely.
If certain territories are genuinely too dangerous for security agencies, how do industrial-scale extraction activities reportedly continue in some remote locations? If they do, who protects those operations? Who authorises their movement? Who verifies what is extracted? Who ensures royalties and export revenues reach public coffers? These are governance questions that demand institutional answers.
Equally important is the international dimension. Minerals extracted in Nigeria ultimately enter global supply chains. Gold may pass through international refining hubs before entering financial markets. Lithium may become part of battery manufacturing destined for electric vehicles, which are being sold across Europe, North America and Asia.
One known fact is that consumers purchasing products containing these minerals rarely know the full story of where they originated.
Increasingly, however, investors and governments are demanding ethical sourcing standards that trace minerals from extraction to final manufacture.
A critical factor that must be taken into cognisance is that if insecurity is creating opportunities for illegal or unethical extraction anywhere in the world, multinational companies have responsibilities alongside national governments, of which the onus falls on the Nigerian government.
Transparency cannot stop at the mine gate. Nor should accountability end at national borders. Another issue requiring attention concerns beneficial ownership.
Across many jurisdictions, shell companies can obscure the identities of individuals ultimately controlling commercial assets. If politically exposed persons or powerful business interests are hidden behind complex corporate structures registered offshore, identifying beneficiaries becomes significantly more difficult. This challenge is hardly unique to Nigeria.
Findings showed that from Latin America to Central Africa and Southeast Asia, resistant corporate networks have frequently complicated efforts to combat corruption and illicit resource extraction. That is precisely why open corporate registries, beneficial ownership databases and transparent mining licence disclosures are becoming global governance priorities. For Nigeria, the stakes could hardly be higher.
The country stands at the centre of the world’s emerging critical minerals economy. The Nigerian government can’t feign ignorance of the fact that, when handled transparently, these resources could finance infrastructure, education, healthcare, and industrial development for generations.
In no way would the government claim not knowing that when handled poorly, they risk becoming another chapter in the well-documented “resource curse,” where extraordinary natural wealth coincides with persistent poverty, insecurity and institutional weakness.
The ultimate challenge, therefore, is not simply about mining. It is about governance. It is about whether public institutions possess both the independence and capacity to ensure that natural resources benefit citizens rather than narrow interests. It is about whether conflict zones receive genuine peacebuilding efforts instead of becoming forgotten frontiers. And it is about whether international markets demand accountability with the same enthusiasm they demand raw materials.
None of these questions should be answered through speculation. They require rigorous investigations, forensic financial analysis, satellite imagery, mining license audits, customs records, beneficial ownership disclosures and courageous journalism.
They require governments willing to open their books. They require international cooperation capable of tracing money across borders. Most importantly, they require asking questions that have too often remained unasked.
Perhaps Nigeria’s security crisis is exactly what it appears to be: a tragic convergence of historical grievances, weak institutions, criminality and environmental pressures. Or perhaps, in some places, another layer of economic incentive deserves closer scrutiny.
Until those questions are thoroughly investigated, one possibility will continue to linger. Maybe the world’s attention has been fixed on the blood spilt above ground, while too little attention has been paid to the extraordinary wealth lying beneath it.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: bl***********@***il.com
Feature/OPED
What Does Nigeria’s $51bn Reserves Milestone Mean if Most New Foreign Money Can Leave Quickly?
Nigeria’s foreign reserves have climbed to about $51 billion, a decade-plus high, according to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). EBC Financial Group (EBC) notes that this reflects stronger investor confidence, but the second half may show whether it holds, as the build rests on three cyclical drivers: oil earnings, short-term foreign money and a narrowing official-to-street naira gap.
Reserves rose from about $32 billion in April 2024, during a dollar shortage, to about $51 billion now, near the CBN’s target. Much came from two cyclical sources, strong oil earnings and money chasing high-yielding naira assets, so EBC expects the pace to slow or reverse. Fitch Ratings, a major international credit rating agency, expects a marginal decline to about $47 billion by the end of 2026, citing higher spending and external pressures.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said, “Nigeria’s reserve build is real but may not be durable yet, because nearly all of the new money is the kind that can leave quickly. Of the $10.37 billion that came in over the first quarter, the overwhelming majority was short-term portfolio funds rather than long-term investment, so a shift in oil prices, global interest rates or confidence in the naira might pull a large part of it straight back out.”
Most New Money Can Still Leave Quickly
The composition of the foreign inflows explains the caution over how long the build can last. The country attracted $10.37 billion in foreign investment in the first quarter of 2026, up 83.83 per cent year-on-year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Of that, $9.86 billion or 95.09 per cent, was portfolio money, largely short-term naira debt such as Treasury bills that investors can sell at the next auction, while foreign direct investment, the long-term kind that builds factories and jobs, was $135.08 million, or 1.30 per cent. Put simply, of each dollar coming in, about 95 cents can leave quickly, and barely one cent stays.
That money supports reserves while it stays. Dollars brought in to buy naira assets add to market supply, letting the CBN hold more reserves and steady the naira. It leaves when conditions change. Nigeria earns most of its export dollars from oil and gas, so lower oil prices mean fewer dollars, and as a member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it cannot simply produce more, output capped by quota and reduced by theft and ageing fields. Higher global interest rates draw money toward safer returns abroad, and a weakening naira prompts investors to sell early. When oil fell in 2016 and 2020, foreign investors withdrew and could not convert naira to dollars as supply dried up, leaving the CBN to clear more than $7 billion in trapped obligations into 2024.
The Oil Boost is No Longer Certain
Oil looked like a dependable source of the dollars behind the reserves only months ago. Earlier in 2026, concern over disruption around the Strait of Hormuz lifted crude prices, and stronger receipts flowed in, with crude oil export earnings of $8.11 billion in the first quarter in the CBN’s balance-of-payments data. That support is now easing. The tension has subsided, and Brent traded near $72 on June 29, down about 24 per cent over the month, back to pre-conflict levels. With the price boost gone and output constrained, reserves are more exposed, leaning on non-oil earnings and investor patience rather than oil.
The Naira Still Trades at Two Prices
The naira has traded at two prices, an official rate and a higher parallel-market rate, and closing that gap into one trusted price is what many investors might watch most. Before committing funds, they may want assurance they can convert naira to dollars at a fair rate when they exit, and a wide gap revives the fear of being trapped that lingers from earlier shortages. The gap has narrowed to roughly N20 to N30, with the CBN’s official rate near N1,380 per dollar on June 26 against parallel-market quotes around N1,400. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2026 Article IV review urged Nigeria to depend less on this fast-moving portfolio money and to keep phasing out its multiple exchange-rate practices. The CBN’s Foreign Exchange Manual, in force from 1 June, is intended to make the market clearer, though such rules build confidence only once investors can freely trade dollars at the posted rate.
What could Make the Build Durable
A few signs that may show the build turning durable include a smaller gap between the official and street naira rates, more long-term foreign investment, and steadier oil earnings. A gap that stays small, now roughly N20 to N30, may mean investors trust the official rate and no longer need the street market. A clear rise in foreign direct investment, only $135 million last quarter against $9.86 billion of short-term money, might mean lasting capital is replacing funds that can leave at the next auction. Oil earnings that hold up, rather than sliding from the low $70s, should help keep reserves steady, since oil and gas bring in most of Nigeria’s export dollars.
“Reserves built on money chasing high yields can fall as fast as they rose, as they did after the last two oil shocks, when investors left, and the CBN spent years clearing a foreign-exchange backlog,” Precious added. “What holds through a downturn is slower money, direct investment, steady oil and non-oil export earnings and one credible naira rate, and that is the shift Nigeria has yet to make.”
By Olajumoke Bello
Across Nigeria, small and medium enterprises remain the backbone of economic activity. They drive trade, create jobs, and sustain millions of livelihoods. Yet, despite their importance, many SMEs continue to operate below their full potential due to persistent structural challenges.
Access to finance remains one of the most cited constraints. However, the issue today goes beyond the availability of capital. Many businesses struggle with financial readiness, weak documentation, and limited understanding of what lenders require. This often leads to missed opportunities, even when funding options exist.
At the same time, SMEs face gaps in market access and visibility. Business owners operate in highly localised environments, with limited exposure to broader networks that can unlock partnerships, new markets, and growth opportunities. This isolation can constrain scalability and reduce long-term competitiveness.
Equally important is the capability gap. Many entrepreneurs grow through resilience and experience but lack structured knowledge on critical areas such as financial management, export readiness, and digital adoption. Without this, even well-capitalised businesses can struggle to sustain growth.
These challenges point to a clear need for a more practical and integrated approach to SME support. It is no longer sufficient to offer standalone solutions. SMEs require ecosystems that combine knowledge, access, and direct engagement in ways that reflect how they actually operate.
A key shift is the move from centralised interventions to localised engagement. SMEs are deeply influenced by their immediate environments, whether markets, industrial clusters, or trade corridors. Solutions must therefore be brought closer to where these businesses function, allowing for more relevant support and stronger relationships.
Another important shift is from awareness to action. Business owners do not only need information; they need insights that they can apply immediately. This includes understanding how to structure their finances, how to access trade opportunities, and how to connect with the right partners to scale their operations.
There is also a growing need for continuity. Many SME-focused initiatives deliver strong initial impact but lack follow-through. For support to be effective, it must extend beyond one-off engagements into sustained relationships, with clear pathways for onboarding, advisory, and growth.
For financial institutions, this presents both responsibility and an opportunity. Supporting SMEs now requires moving beyond transactional banking to deeper partnership models. It requires understanding businesses at a granular level and co-creating solutions that evolve with their needs.
At Stanbic IBTC, this perspective continues to shape our approach to SME development. Our focus is on delivering practical support that translates into real business outcomes, helping enterprises grow, compete, and contribute more meaningfully to the economy.
As part of this commitment, we are extending our SME engagement to the regions through the Nigeria Business Summit Regional Tour. The tour will take structured, on-ground activations into key commercial hubs, where SMEs can access funding guidance, trade insights, advisory support, and direct engagement with financial experts.
The regional tour will take place across five strategic locations, bringing these solutions closer to business owners in Aba, Onitsha, Ibadan and Kano.
This approach reflects an important principle. When support moves closer to businesses and when solutions are delivered in ways that are practical and continuous, SMEs are better positioned to grow sustainably. In turn, this strengthens not only individual enterprises but the broader economy.
Olajumoke Bello is the Head of Enterprise Banking at Stanbic IBTC Bank
