World
Ethiopia, Egypt and South Africa: Pursuing Relationships Within and Beyond BRICS
By Professor Maurice Okoli
Introduction
Ultimately, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) has established itself as an informal association pursuing comprehensive and multi-dimensional cooperation. It has also, in the course of its operations, created a platform for discussing important topics relating to economic growth, developing trade and economic exchanges, ensuring security as well as promoting education and culture. According to several previous summit reports, the economic power is shifting from the West to the Global South. One of the landmarked achievements was the ascension of three African countries: Ethiopia and Egypt (Jan. 2024) and South Africa (2010). Russia is chairing the association this year. The main event of 2024 for BRICS will be the summit, which will be held in Kazan in October.
Under Russia’s chairmanship, integrating more new members into BRICS has been suspended, although the ‘strategic expansion’ was considered an explicit testament to the association’s remarkable growing attraction and its commitment to reshaping the global economic landscape.
While the geopolitics intensifies, BRICS has prioritized the economic dimension of its operations, desirous to design the necessary instruments for substituting those of multinational organizations such International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Closely related to this are the loans for investment projects and the financial payment systems. The analysis here, thus focuses on the economic architecture of Ethiopia, Egypt and South Africa – African members of BRICS.
BRICS Bank
Regarding the broader historical significance of this association, the founding members consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, and China held the first summit in Yekaterinburg in 2009, with South Africa joining it a year later, discussed creating the BRICS bank as a geopolitical ‘alternative’ to IMF and the World Bank. The summit documents contained explanatory reasons as ‘operating financial activities mainly based on non-interference, equality, and mutual benefit’ among members and other developing countries. They planned to set up this New Development Bank by 2014 but was later established in 2015.
The financial architecture of BRICS is made of the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). These components were signed into a treaty in 2014 and became active in 2015. (See its report April 2024). New Development Bank, sometimes referred to as the BRICS Development Bank, by definition is ‘a multilateral development bank’ operated by the five BRICS states. In 2021, Bangladesh, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Uruguay joined the NDB. The bank’s primary focus of lending is infrastructure projects with authorized lending of up to $34 billion annually. As of 2023, it had 53 projects worth around $15 billion. Its plan on giving out $15 billion to member states to help their struggling economies never materialized.
Financial Commitments
The core question was the initial financial shareholding. In July 2014, during the sixth BRICS summit in Fortaleza, the BRICS signed the document to create $100 billion as the startup capital and the currency pool for the bank. China committed $41 billion towards the pool; Brazil, India, and Russia $18 billion each; and South Africa $5 billion. China, which held the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves and contributed the bulk of the currency pool, wanted a more significant managing role. China also wanted to be the location of the reserve, thus making the bank to be headquartered in Shanghai, China. Until 2024, it has a skeleton office in Moscow, Russia, and Johannesburg, South Africa, as compared to many representative offices and normal-size staff of IMF and World Bank across Africa.
BRICS payment system
At the 2015 BRICS summit in Russia, ministers from the BRICS states initiated consultations for a payment system that would be an alternative to the SWIFT system. The stated goal was to initially move to settlements in national currencies. The Central Bank of Russia highlighted the main benefits as backup and redundancy in case there were disruptions to the SWIFT system. China also launched its alternative to SWIFT: the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System, which enables financial institutions worldwide to send and receive information about financial transactions. India also has its alternative Structured Financial Messaging System (SFMS), as do Russia SPFS and Brazil Pix, (according to the BRICS report July 2024).
Ethiopia, Egypt and South Africa’s Demography
Ethiopia: With Ethiopia and Egypt taking full membership with effect on 1 January 2024, joining South Africa illustrated BRICS expansion from the Maghreb through East Africa down to Southern Africa. South Africa and Egypt are the economic powerhouses, while Ethiopia ranks 8th position in the continent. Angola and Nigeria rank above Ethiopia. With about 126.5 million people (2023), Ethiopia is the second most populous nation in Africa after Nigeria (June 2024 stands at 229.6), and one of the fastest-growing economies in the region. Ethiopia aims to reach lower-middle-income status by 2025. Ethiopia holds the headquarters of the AU.
Egypt: Located in the topmost north Africa along the Mediterranean Sea, Egypt considers itself as part of the Arab world. The permanent headquarters of the Arab League are located in Cairo and the body’s secretary general has traditionally been an Egyptian. At approximately 100 million inhabitants, Egypt is the 14th-most populated country in the world, and the third-most populated in Africa. Egypt’s economy depends mainly on agriculture, petroleum exports, natural gas, and tourism. There are also more than three million Egyptians working abroad, mainly in Libya, Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf and Europe. Egypt is a member of the Association of Arab States and the African Union (AU).
South Africa: South Africa is the southernmost country on the African continent. Its remoteness—it lies thousands of miles distant from major African cities such as Lagos and Cairo and more than 6,000 miles (10,000 km) away from most of Europe, North America, and eastern Asia, where its major trading partners are located. According to the 2023 census, the population of South Africa was about 62 million people of diverse origins, cultures, languages, and religions. South Africa has a mixed economy, emerging market, and upper-middle-income economy, one of only eight such countries in Africa. the country has a comparative advantage in the production of agriculture, mining and manufacturing products relating to these sectors. Several reports indicate that, in principle, its principal international trading partners—besides other African countries—include Germany, the United States, China, Japan, the United Kingdom, Bangladesh and Spain. Over the last few decades, South Africa has also established itself as a popular tourist destination. Further, it is among the G20, and is the only African country that is a permanent member of the G20 group, and as a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU).
Development Challenges
- Ethiopia’s relations with neighbours are very complicated, and also it suffers from natural disasters. Russia tended to make a greater impact when it offered sympathy and support with humanitarian aid of grains to the affected and impoverished communities in Ethiopia. In November and December 2023, Russia delivered these grains, as humanitarian aid, to Ethiopia alongside Zimbabwe, Kenya, Burkina Faso and Mali. More are still vulnerable to natural and conflict disasters at the present stage.
According to the World Bank report (2023), Ethiopia seeks to chart a development path that is sustainable and inclusive to accelerate poverty reduction and boost shared prosperity. Achieving these objectives will require addressing key challenges including the following:
(i) addressing macroeconomic private sector development, structural transformation, and generation of jobs,
(ii) reducing the incidence of conflict that has been having a substantial impact on lives, livelihoods, and infrastructure. Overcoming the effects of the coronavirus pandemic.
(iii) addressing food insecurity, which is growing due to adverse weather events, locust invasion, conflict, and global conditions leading to high inflation of food prices.
(iv) improving human capital which is far lower than the average for the Sub-Saharan Africa region.
(v) generating good jobs. The country’s growing workforce (with roughly 2 million persons reaching working age per year) puts pressure on the absorption capacity of the labour market and necessitates improving current jobs while creating sufficient new jobs.
- Despite its profound geopolitical and multifaceted relations with key external powers, its membership in G20 and BRICS, South Africa’s greatest challenge is huge energy deficits. After years of sub-standard maintenance and the South African government’s inability to manage strategic resources, the state-owned power supplier Eskom has been experiencing a deficiency in capacity to supply sufficient power nationwide. Industrial production is, to a large extent, negatively affected by these energy setbacks.
- In the case of Egypt as a member of BRICS, it has external players such as the United States, China, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. Since taking over political power, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi has been strengthening the military and limiting the political opposition. Under El-Sisi, Egypt, the Egyptian economy entered an ongoing crisis, the Egyptian pound was one of the worst-performing currencies, and inflation reached nearly 40% in March 2024. It has received United States foreign aid over the past few years (an average of $2.2 billion per year) and is the third-largest recipient of such funds from the United States.
In its annual report (2024), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has rated Egypt as one of the top countries in Africa undertaking economic reforms. But a lot more economic lapses have still engulfed the economy, and a greater part of the population lives below the average subsistence level. An estimated 2.7 million Egyptians abroad contribute actively to the development of their country through remittances ($7.8 billion in 2021), as well as circulation of human and social capital and investment. Remittances, money earned by Egyptians living abroad and sent home, reached a record $21 billion in 2023, according to the World Bank.
Brazilian Dilma Rousseff and BRICS Bank
During the latest meeting held on June 6, 2024, President Vladimir Putin and President of the BRICS New Development Bank, Dilma Rousseff, agreed on some important issues. These include the fact that the bank becomes more sustainable and operational and operates within developing multipolar economic architecture and strengthening its economic base. In 2024, Russia presides over BRICS, Russia and Brazil are co-founders of this bank, now headed by Dilma Rousseff. In the new emerging multipolar world, BRICS members and other developing countries, especially those in the Global South have consistently criticized the IMF and the World Bank and further called for reforms. Nevertheless, Putin and Rousseff have taken the common position that the BRICS bank has an essential role to play in the multipolar economy. Of course, the multipolar world is also reflected in national currencies, which is another obligation of the bank: to attract and carry out settlements in national currencies. This is very important for developing countries that do not have strong currencies and suffer greatly from exchange rate volatility. (See Kremlin report – June 6, 2024).
Obviously, the BRICS bank claims to be working independently without any political strings. In the current conditions, it is not easy to do so, given the developments in global finance and the use of the dollar as a political weapon. Now the world is indeed going through many challenges. There are crisis trends and inflation in advanced countries, and in the developing world, nations are facing debt problems. Of course, the countries in the developing world are now primarily in serious condition. According to Rousseff remarks: “The bank should play a major role in the development of a multipolar, polycentric world. Russia is a very important partner in BRICS and the New Development Bank and is fulfilling all of its commitments. And, indeed, the bank is facing many problems, primarily concerning liquidity.” (See Kremlin report – July 26, 2023).
The Kremlin website quoted Putin as follows: “Our development strategy for the 2022–2026 period aims to draw about 30 per cent of our funds from domestic markets. It is also very important to attract funds in different currencies, not just dollars or euros. We are well aware of the difficulties encountered by the developing nations in their bid to attract investment. They need resources to finance infrastructure projects, develop digital and social logistics, and, of course, reach their goals in environmental protection. Everyone is focused on their debt, ignoring their need for resources. It seems unacceptable to impose certain terms and requirements on them in exchange for funding like multilateral international organisations are doing now.” (See Kremlin report – July 26, 2023).
On November 14, 2019, Putin and other BRICS leaders met with members of the BRICS Business Council and the management of the New Development Bank. Approval was given for internal procedures to launch a technical support foundation aimed at helping entrepreneurs draft high-quality design documents when applying for a bank loan. That year (2019) saw an increase in the number of regional branches of the bank. The African Regional Centre in Johannesburg. A bank branch in Latin America was launched in Brazil. And the necessary procedures for the opening of the bank’s Moscow office in the first half of 2020.
It was acknowledged that the bank, as a key international financial institution, is efficient in investment and lending, and expanded its investment project portfolio which rose, and exceeded $12 billion, with seven of 44 approved projects being implemented in Russia. The bank also supported the ‘Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership’ until 2025, which was adopted at its summit in Russia in 2015. (See BRICS report – November 2019).
BRICS Bank and other Multinationals (IMF and World Bank)
The basic question currently asked is what place does BRICS bank holds in the global economy, and how comparable to other multinational financial institutions. Overcoming the impact of the global crisis, the BRICS bank has to follow the same path of comprehensive renovation. It has made its key tasks including investing in the economy through concessional loans, to achieve alleviating poverty and hardships to sustainable economic growth. The bank’s documents show interest in engaging in traditional sectors such as alternative energy, information, telecommunications and new medical technologies, processing of mineral resources and working towards agricultural production growth. Many of such advantageous sectors have attracted some forms of loans from the BRICS bank since its establishment and have also recorded some successes and achievements.
For this article, traditional comparisons are necessary to deepen the understanding of the theme under discussion and analysis. Historically the IMF and the World Bank, in their functional pursuits, have been extremely active with their targeted operations in various geographical regions. Despite the current criticisms and demands for reforms and a review of their approach, the IMF and the World Bank have introduced a new system of global economic governance in their operations. Thanks to a common approach which is noticeable until today the IMF and the World Bank are consistently in favour of financing operations in emerging and developing economies. At the Pittsburgh G-20 summit held in 2009, both financial institutions pledged forms of support for economic growth in developing countries. (See IMF and World Report, June 2009)
Ethiopia, Egypt and South Africa (BRICS members) constitute part of developing countries and distinctively are located in Africa. Today these three countries are reputable members of the BRICS informal association, but at the same time entangled in the financial network of the IMF and the World Bank. An official summarized report indicated that the IMF, in June 2023, concluded the Article IV consultation with South Africa. South Africa’s economy is facing mounting economic and social challenges. The pathway out to contain the economic shortfall and, as it was an election period, was to swiftly address economic complexity as the last resort was to approach the World and IMF for another packet of loans. Before that, a $4.3 billion loan, at about 1.1% interest, was granted to South Africa to manage the immediate consequences of the fallout from the coronavirus pandemic which broke out in 2019. The practical benefit is that the IMF loan played a supportive role in stabilizing South Africa’s situation. South Africa is still facing multiple economic bottlenecks, a deteriorating situation, and worse, it will struggle to pay back its debts to foreign financial institutions. South Africa’s external debt reached over $170 billion in 2021, which is the highest stock of foreign debt in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Egypt’s current situation is not different from South Africa and Ethiopia. The North African country has been addressing its economic development capitalizing on the contradictions in the global system. In 2021, Egypt’s total external debt reached around $143 billion. The latest development, in July 2024, the IMF and Egypt reached a preliminary agreement that should help unlock the next disbursement of a $8 billion loan.
As part of Ethiopia’s macroeconomic reform program endorsement, the latest IMF update released in August 2024, foreign creditors have granted financing assurances to Ethiopia enabling the government to fast-track approval of new loans by the IMF and the World Bank. An official creditor committee offered firm assurances to restructure loans and outstanding debts. Reports explicitly show that Italy, Japan, India, and Saudi Arabia are among the other members of the committee. Ethiopia aims to restructure billions of dollars in external debt using the Group of 20’s Common Framework mechanism, which seeks to coordinate talks between official, commercial and private creditors. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed told parliament in July 2024 that expected talks with the Washington-based IMF and World Bank could unlock more than $10 billion in financing in the coming years.
Further analysing several reports, Egypt and South Africa, being BRICS members in addition to Ethiopia, have contracted loans for developing their economies. The most difficult tasks include their demands for financial reforms, restructuring existing debts and at the same time contracting new loans from these Western multinational financial institutions. These are the realistic scenarios with Ethiopia, Egypt and South Africa, primarily due to the incapacity and tardiness of the New Development Bank established by BRICS. With its particular bilateral interest, aspirations and perspectives, China’s Export-Import Bank, as one of the policy instruments, over the past two decades, has supported several development initiatives across Africa. At least, China has illustrated its financial strength, ensuring and reshaping Africa’s economic future. Imperatively, China’s position is that developing the economy and engaging in economic sectors as an important aspect of improving the lives of the impoverished, is partly the surest way to ensure peace and order in Africa.
Notwithstanding all the distinctive points discussed above, the BRICS bank considers Ethiopia, Egypt, South Africa, and other partners with their support for a multipolar world, beginning to create a solid foundation for dialogue, to actively cooperate and collaborate in the economic sphere. The bank operators, however, declared confidence that cooperation, as frequently put “reliable and mutually beneficial partnership relations” would benefit the developing countries and their peoples, – and among BRICS members has a great future. Against this backdrop, the BRICS New Development Bank has to re-prioritize its high-impact operations that are connected to the development objectives of its members and consistent commitments under the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In addition, it has to facilitate a deeper understanding and forge partnerships focusing on mobilising resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in its member countries, and to strengthen South-South cooperation.
Some experts further say BRICS ‘strategic expansion’ will raise significantly its status and could amplify the association’s declared ambitions to become a champion of the Global South. According to historical records, the first meeting of the association began in St. Petersburg in 2005. It was called RIC, which stood for Russia, India and China. Then, the BRIC group was formed by four of the world’s fastest-growing economies – Brazil, Russia, India, and China. In December 2010, South Africa joined the BRIC association, now referred to as BRICS, ‘an informal association’ of five countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
*Professor Maurice Okoli is a fellow at the Institute for African Studies and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. He is also a fellow at the North-Eastern Federal University of Russia. He is an expert at the Roscongress Foundation and the Valdai Discussion Club. As an academic researcher and economist with a keen interest in current geopolitical changes and the emerging world order, Maurice Okoli frequently contributes articles for publication in reputable media portals on different aspects of the interconnection between developing and developed countries, particularly in Asia, Africa and Europe. With comments and suggestions, he can be reached via email: ma***********@***il.com.
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African Graduates Association Promoting Multifaceted Initiatives With Russian Educational Institutions
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
In preparations for the third Russia-Africa Summit, scheduled for late October 2026, Dr Francois Ngan, deputy chairman of the Union of Associations of African Graduates of Soviet and Russian Universities, during an official working visit, has held a consultative meeting with Professor Vladimir Filippov, the President of the Russian University of Peoples’ Friendship (RUDN), and former Minister of Higher Education of Russia, Chairman of the National Commission for Accreditation of Higher Education.
RUDN is an educational institution established in 1960, primarily to provide higher education to Third World students. It has now become a popular multidisciplinary spot for many students, especially from developing countries. The university offers various academic programmes and has research infrastructure that comprises laboratories and interdisciplinary centres. The university is named after the former Congolese leader, Patrice Lumumba.
Dr Francois Ngan and Professor Filippov discussed the importance of the Graduates Association as a continental platform dedicated to strengthening unity, cooperation, and promoting shared progress among African graduates who studied in the former Soviet Union and in the Russian Federation. They also reviewed multifaceted initiatives that could bring together alumni associations from across Africa, whose members obtained education and professional training, and cultural experiences in Soviet and Russian institutions of higher learning.
Professor Filippov expressed optimism in addressing emerging challenges as a result of shifting geopolitical changes, emphasised strategic cooperation in the educational sphere with Africa, in general, and with the Republic of Cameroon, in particular, and further about the integration of African students during their studies in the Russian Federation.
The meeting also touched on academic and scientific work, the possibility of rewriting a scientific thesis, and the official organisation of transferring versions translated into six languages for the library of RUDN. Significant questions relating to Russia’s educational opportunities, collaborations and partnerships involving African countries were thoroughly discussed.
The Union of Associations of African Graduates of Soviet and Russian Universities was created under one continental umbrella to promote friendship, for professional networking, to engage in cultural exchange, and with particular emphasis on forging strategic cooperation between Africa and Russia.
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Russia to Support Industrial Growth, Technological Advancement and Supply Chain Resilience across Africa
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
With the heightening of geopolitical rivalry and competition, a new Russia-Africa working group has emerged as a significant institutional mechanism and plans to focus on facilitating and monitoring strategic investments, industrialisation, and infrastructural development—the Strategic Action Plan 2023-2026—that was outlined during the second Russia-Africa summit, in St.Petersburg, the second largest city in the Russian Federation.
While substantial progress has, largely, lagged on the multidimensional economic front with Africa primarily due to its internal difficulties and the complexity of relations with its former Soviet neighbours, Russian officials believe there still remains huge untapped potential in strengthening bilateral cooperation. As planned, President Vladimir Putin has already signed an executive order that directs Moscow to host the forthcoming third Russia-Africa summit in October 2026.
On June 30, a regular meeting of the Business Council on Africa was held under the chairmanship of the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry. It was dedicated to issues of trade, economic and investment cooperation with Africa. The group discussed the current state and prospects for the implementation of policy initiatives with an emphasis on assisting the countries of the continent, strengthening their economic, energy, technological and food sovereignty, as well as training specialists for Africa.
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has reiterated that Russia-Africa relations primarily depend on an understanding of the importance of collective action based on the principles of equality, mutual respect and resolving common tasks. In the past few years, Russia-Africa cooperation has been noticeably strengthening. “We are deepening political dialogues, developing bilateral contacts with African countries, promoting cordial cooperation between ministries and departments, and expanding humanitarian exchanges. We are also continuing the structural diversification of trade partnerships and economic dimensions.”
“Next on the agenda is the launch of diplomatic missions in The Gambia, Liberia, Togo, and the Union of the Comoros,” Lavrov said at a meeting of the Business Council under the Russian foreign minister. Lavrov noted that Russian embassies began operating in three other African countries in 2025: Niger, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan. A new Department for Partnership with Africa was also established. According to the top diplomat, “expanding Russia’s diplomatic presence on the continent contributes to developing relations.”
There are already 45 Russian embassies operating in Africa. The Russian foreign minister noted that Moscow is quickly rebuilding its presence in African countries, which sharply declined during the collapse of the Soviet Union. “There will be literally four or five countries left where we still need to establish full-fledged embassies, and then, we will have 100 per cent coverage of the entire African continent with our diplomatic presence,” Lavrov emphasised.
After the first summit in October 2019, the Foreign Ministry also created the Secretariat of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum. Its main tasks include controlling the roadmap to Africa’s multidimensional cooperation and guiding potential Russian investors to the continent. This also underscored the priority and post-Soviet solidarity Russia currently attaches to its policy towards Africa, within the growing framework of the emerging new architecture of multipolarity in the Global South.
In an interview in June 2026, the director of the Department of Partnership with Africa at the Foreign Ministry, Tatyana Dovgalenko, shared a few insights in the lead-up to the third summit. Furthermore, Dovgalenko explained that Russia would move away from security to concentrate more on economic issues, especially to team up with African colleagues to streamline mechanisms for implementing projects that will ensure food security and agriculture, and help Africa in installing processing facilities to support its self-sufficiency. She also emphasised energy and vital infrastructures, and the third direction was to simultaneously work more coherently with sub-regional organisations.
Over the past few years, bilateral relations have been increasing. There are positive dynamics in trade turnover, estimated at $30 billion. Steps are being taken to build payment systems, preferably in national currencies, while Russia looks to open four more diplomatic offices, bringing the total to 48 across Africa. Russia is currently training 37,000 African students, but only approximately 1/3 on state scholarships in Russia’s educational institutions. “We are ready to share valuable experiences of building a sovereign development model with African partners to achieve self-reliant economic growth based on their own resources and capabilities. Russia aims at creating processing capabilities and localising production, and provides access to advanced technological solutions,” underlined Dovgalenko in her interview with New Eastern Outlook.
For African countries that have endured difficult decades on the path to political independence, it is now important to take full control over the untapped resources, direct income and revenue toward stimulating the national economic sector, rather than paying for the well-being of the Western “golden billion” during this changing geopolitical era, according to Dovgalenko.
According to reports, the forthcoming Russia-Africa summit will have an economic agenda, including the digital economy, technology, artificial intelligence, healthcare, investment, and settlements in global trade. Of course, the agenda will also cover Africa’s political aspects. But if African friends bring along any specific ideas, Russia will give them serious attention. In addition, with continuity and consistency, pay increased attention to expanding ties with Africa’s regional integration associations.
Going forward, the focus will be on translating strong trade relations into deeper investment partnerships, fostering technology collaboration, strengthening industrial linkages and contributing towards the shared objectives set by the leadership of both African countries and Russia. At the third summit, the above-mentioned specific initiatives will be further designed. In this regard, the key document, the new action plan for the next three-year period (2027-2029), is intended to reflect dynamic realities in the future relations of Russia and Africa
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
At the 12th Primakov Readings conference held in Moscow on June 24, Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, categorically emphasised that BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) has suspended its future ambitions of expansion, citing divergences and rising perceptions over emerging geopolitical changes between members of the BRICS association. BRICS has experienced tectonic appreciation for its latest expansion from five to ten members, and for creating ‘partner membership’ status for 13 countries. While this was considered a significant achievement under Russia’s chairmanship in 2024, it has now turned into an obstacle confronting BRICS.
Lavrov acknowledged this key obstacle, sharp differences and disputes, as tarnishing the image and hindering, to some degree, the progress of the BRICS association. Primakov Readings was held to underline one of its aspirations, that is, to advance the growing question of multipolarity. In order to make a noticeable headway in establishing a new world order, it is necessary to rope in the East and the Global South to denounce the “rules-based order” and hegemony of the United States and Europe. BRICS, thus, conveniently, provides a platform for these countries to raise their voice and interaction in multilateral institutions and organisations. Acting collectively, they could considerably participate and expectedly rise to the global stage.
In his speech, Lavrov reiterated that the United States and the West in general have not accepted the objective reality of an emerging multipolar world order. They prefer propping up their weakening positions by forcing others to side with them, imposing sanctions, enacting bans, issuing threats and taking other illegitimate measures to force the Global Majority to play their game.
Lavrov, however, raised his genuine criticism: The West persists in its refusal to abide by the universally recognised international norms as outlined in the UN Charter, and has never fully respected them, in fact, even if everyone signing and ratifying the Charter undertakes to fully comply with its norms in their entirety and interconnection. This includes the sovereign equality of states and non-interference in domestic affairs, as well as respecting and guaranteeing human rights regardless of race, sex, language, or religion, to quote the UN Charter.
To unlock the potential of new powerhouses in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, a comprehensive agreement was initiated between China and Russia, as staunch driving forces behind BRICS, to increase its numerical strength by proposing new membership for BRICS. It all started with a pretext by inviting South Africa to join BRICS in 2010, then, under Russia’s presidency in 2024, the association moved from five to ten, by total membership.
Nevertheless, after only a couple of years, the planned ‘membership drive’ ultimately proved to be an obstacle to be managed within the current framework of BRICS. For China and Russia, this is a matter of regulatory principle – apparently, it will certainly not produce any positive results. In the end, to logically suspend BRICS’ future expansion. Without mincing words, Lavrov noted this point clearly: “We continue to comprehensively develop them while trying to stimulate the trilateral RIC – Russia-India-China – group. That format was shaped about 30 years ago at the initiative of Yevgeny Primakov and formed the core of BRICS. In our associations, cooperation is based on mutual respect and readiness to search for consensus solutions even when this is a challenging task. These things happen, and quite often. But the solutions we eventually find are guaranteed to serve common interests. That is why the number of countries willing to join the operations of BRICS and the SCO keeps growing, namely, in Central and Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America,” Lavrov said.
Mentioning BRICS during the Primakov Readings forum in late June 2026 was quite important, as Yevgeny Primakov anticipated the evolutionary social development trends during his time. After the collapse of the Soviet era in 1991, we can see that the number of BRICS member states has almost doubled. While explaining these latest developments, that the number of full members has increased from five to ten, Lavrov further pointed out that “this is not how it happened when BRIC accepted South Africa, and the addition of one country posed questions that needed to be clarified to ensure forward movement. When BRICS turned into a group of ten, it was decided to give the new members time to adjust to each other. I believe that it is a correct decision.”
During the meeting of the BRICS Council of Foreign Ministers in India, discussions were held, in practical terms, a difficult conversation between Iranian and Emirati members. This happened in the hottest period of the Gulf confrontation, but eventually, it was managed to coordinate a joint document, despite the highly emotional opinions expressed by both sides. This was one case in point.
But, according to Lavrov’s explanation, other examples go deeper, to clashing economic interests. That is why it has been decided against pushing for further expansion for a few years. But the partner countries attend these events, which is creating grounds for giving BRICS a more universal dimension.
As for the agenda, BRICS is not an organisation, but rather an informal association. This is its strong side, because it would be wrong to create a rigid structure, at least at the current stage, especially a global structure rather than a continental or regional one. Many find this confusing. At least Russia won’t propose formalising BRICS, with the same structural status as the United Nations (UN).
Interesting to note and remind here, in an interview with Sky News Arabia on September 20, 2024, Lavrov expressed scepticism but was straight to the point about the strategic expansion of BRICS. Under Russia’s BRICS presidency, five countries – Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates became the second wave of the newest members to join BRICS.
Tracking down the history, operations and achievements, Lavrov acknowledged, in his interview, that BRICS is consolidating its positions and cooperating with some countries. At the same time, this association is facing serious challenges. It is necessary to promote collaboration based on a balance of interests, and most importantly, BRICS functions based on consensus. The consensus principle primarily aims at finding agreements that reflect the mutual accord of all participants. In practical terms, the more partners, the harder it is to search for accord. It takes more time to finalise any consensus-based agreement than a vote-based solution.
According to Lavrov, BRICS expansion has sparked debates and discussions over the past several years. The foreign minister indicated, and repeatedly explained, the “suspension” of membership in BRICS was primarily due to internal differences, perceptions and approach to geopolitical changes. As stipulated by the guidelines, there are no concrete criteria or rules for admission except using the flexible term “consensus” – a general agreement at summits, which was utilised in the selection process.
At the Primakov Readings, previously held in June 2024, the key point was an announcement by Sergey Lavrov over the ‘suspension’ of new membership. Then, in mid-June 2024, Lavrov hosted the BRICS Foreign Ministers Council in Russia’s Nizhny Novgorod. The BRICS Foreign Ministers decided to suspend admission of new members, and this step was reflected in the final documents.
At present, the annual agenda is determined by the rotating presidency of BRICS. However, practice shows that every successive presiding country strives to ensure continuity. For example, during India’s presidency, BRICS members have been actively working to implement the initiatives which Russia presented during the Kazan summit in autumn 2024. Therefore, it is true that many countries are willing to join the group, which is an inspiring fact. However, BRICS looks for new forms of partner engagement and will, most probably, expand the informal association again.
As a show of indivisible and close-partnered bilateral relationship, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, without the least hesitancy, underlined this final decision to postpone BRICS expansion, at the summit in Kazan, capital of the autonomous Tatarstan Republic of the Russian Federation.
