Feature/OPED
African Union Establishes Vaccine Manufacturing Facility: Challenges and Perspectives
By Professor Maurice Okoli
The African Union, an organization uniting African states, has made a legitimate decision to establish a vaccine manufacturing facility inside Africa, despite the fierce initial resistance by the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Covid-19 pandemic, the critical period when widespread coronavirus endangered human lives, has rightly taught Africans lessons, especially the heightened discrimination in the supply and distribution of vaccines by Western and industrialized nations we referred to as the Global North.
Until today, Africans vividly remember their sentimental feelings characterized by sudden lockdown and social distancing. In the African context, most cultural group activities were suspended, and small traders and vendors shut behind doors without any revenue-earning employment. In short, the complex and unbearable adverse effects on small- and medium-scale businesses are still felt even as coronavirus has subsided, but not completely disappeared from society.
As part of stringent measures to contain future disease outbreaks and public health risks, for effective future responses, the Africa CDC is developing sustainable mechanisms such as local vaccine manufacturing facilities, strongly supported by African leaders and the African Union. The Africa CDC is mandated to strengthen Africa’s public health institutions’ capacity and capability and seek local and foreign partnerships to ensure a healthy Africa.
According to the Africa CDC report, about a quarter of Africa’s 1.4 billion population will be fully vaccinated against Covid-19 by the end of 2022. In the report, the target for Africa remains to vaccinate 70% of the population. That goal, however, was set by the World Health Organization (WHO) for the overall population. But due to delays in international vaccine deliveries, Africa largely lags behind the rest of the world.
Since Africa has no production facility, the vaccinations have been made mainly with Johnson & Johnson’s vaccine (42%), followed by Pfizer (22%), AstraZeneca (17%), China’s Sinopharm (15%) and Sinovac (7%). Currently, just more than 800 million doses of vaccines have been administered in Africa, or 80% of the total received.
Russia’s much-heralded vaccine diplomacy is neither vaccine diplomacy nor development assistance. Instead, it is a form of mercantilism, an effort by the state and its proxy to develop, market and sell Russian products abroad.
In February 2021, Russia offered the African Union 300 million doses of Sputnik V with financing packages for countries wanting to purchase them. Yet at $10 per dose for two doses of vaccine, Sputnik V was offered on terms making it significantly more expensive than the vaccine by AstraZeneca ($3 per dose), Pfizer ($6,75 per dose) and Johnson and Johnson ($10 for one dose-short vaccine).
Considering the cost implications, AU brokered with the French pharmacy brand Johnson and Johnson instead of Russian Sputnik V. Potential customers have also taken note of logistical challenges that plagued Russian officials’ vaccine efforts, combined with delivery delays, encouraged many desperate countries to look elsewhere during the crisis. Given these shortcomings, it is not all that surprising that Moscow’s strategic attempt to use vaccine diplomacy to showcase itself as a partner for Africa has not been very successful as envisioned.
At the Global Financing Summit held in Paris on 22-23 June 2023, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa emphasized the importance of vaccine manufacturing inside the continent; the further focus should be on developing actual vaccine R&D capacity, which must necessarily lead to health products. And this also requires substantial investment and a long-term commitment from external players and financial institutions. Notwithstanding those previous disappointments from external partners, at least African leaders have been rallying together to ensure that no effort is spared in facilitating and supporting the building of large-scale vaccine manufacturing capacity in the continent. The African Vaccine Manufacturing Summit held in April 2021 was an encouraging start, a collective effort to change the status quo.
Under the aegis of the African Union, the Africa CDC and the African Medicines Agency (AMA) are coordinating and cooperating to swiftly address health issues, including vaccine manufacturing and distribution in the continent. According to African Union’s report in mid-June 2023, the African Medicines Agency (AMA), a newly launched continental regulatory body for medical products, is concretely set to start its work, with its headquarters in Kigali, Rwanda. Rwanda was selected to host the agency during a 2022 AU Executive Council meeting in Lusaka, Zambia.
AMA is a specialized agency of the African Union (AU) intended to facilitate the harmonization of medical products regulation throughout the AU to improve access to quality, safe and productive medical products on the continent. Many AU member states, including Rwanda, ratified the treaty establishing the continental agency and deposited the legal instrument of ratification to the AU Commission. On June 10, for instance, Rwanda and the AU signed the host country agreement, an important step marking the start of the work by AMA.
The Health Minister Ruwanda Dr Sabin Nsanzimana emphasized the institution’s key role in building confidence in the quality of health products on the continent, promoting cooperation and mutual recognition in regulatory decisions and facilitating the movement of health products. The agency is tipped to enhance the capacity of state parties to regulate medical products and to improve Africa’s access to quality, safe, and productive medical products.
As we know, Rwanda’s government has already provided space for the agency’s operations. The following steps include getting leaders for the institution and establishing facilities like laboratories, et cetera. With much praise, AMA will contribute to medicine production on the continent and allow it to move across Africa.
In terms of bilateral relations, China and Africa will always be a community of a shared future. At least, its policies are strategically focused on addressing sustainable development. China has proved, over the years, in many aspects of dealing with Africa. Results are seen especially with all kinds of infrastructure built these years. And, of course, Chinese firms are actively engaging in joint vaccine production in Africa with local firms, helping countries, following their wishes, to realize localized vaccine production. According to reports, Chinese firms have started localized output in Egypt and signed cooperative agreements with Morocco and Algeria.
The headquarters building was completed after an agreement between the AU and China on the Africa CDC HQ’s building project in July 2020. it is now becoming one of the best-equipped centres for disease control in Africa, allowing the Africa CDC to play its role as the technical institution coordinating disease prevention, surveillance and power in the continent in partnership with the national public health institutes and ministries of Member States.
By combating Covid-19, China and Africa withstand severe challenges, helping each other and fighting side by side to defeat the pandemic through solidarity and cooperation. In essence, China is participating in the African Vaccine Manufacturing Partnership (AVMP) launched by the African Union in April 2021. This Continental Vaccine Manufacturing Vision is “to ensure that Africa has timely access to vaccines to protect public health security by establishing a sustainable vaccine development and manufacturing ecosystem in Africa.”
It is also a splendid testimony of China’s steadfast support for Africa. “Together, we have written a splendid chapter of mutual assistance amidst complex changes and set a shining example for building a new type of international relations,” Chinese President Xi Jinping said in one of his speeches, emphasizing the principles of China’s Africa policy as pursuing the greater good and shared interests.
While discussing this vital question, it is critical to strengthen the capacity and to prepare for future pandemics based on the sentiments, and latest first-hand experiences during the Covid-19 period. The fear and the uncertainties engulfed human lives, the overall impact on the economic performance across Africa. Worth to note here that African leaders have passionately called on G7 leaders to increase investments in research and innovation for vaccines, new drugs and diagnostics to help reach the goals the World Health Organization set.
More interesting – apparently, recent arguments among health experts have offered enough grounds for finding at least modest but sustainable health solutions. We can now praise the Africa CDC and AU for their joint support; that alone is one giant leap for establishing vaccine development and manufacturing inside Africa.
The key focus of this new agreement is forging new and strengthened partnerships to reach the millions who still lack access to vaccines and other essential health services. We have already acknowledged that the global Covid-19 pandemic and climate change have, to some degree, jeopardized the health, security and livelihoods of people across Africa.
Patrick Tippoo, Executive Director at the Africa Vaccine Manufacturing Initiative, argues that vaccine manufacturing is a complex, time-consuming exercise requiring considerable commitment and financial and technical resources. He further underscores that the capital investment required is significant and equally essential in a long-term future view for Africa’s health system and population. Therefore, African leaders need to rally together to ensure that no effort is spared in facilitating and supporting the building of large-scale vaccine manufacturing capacity on the continent.
The African Union could contribute in the following ways: (i) the mobilization of resources and creating enabling environments for help to be unlocked and discharged, as vaccine production is capital intensive and requires access to innovative funding streams over 10-20 years.
(ii) Accelerate efforts to create streamlined regulatory processes for speedier accreditation of vaccine manufacturing facilities and licensing products to ensure that vaccines can be available in the fastest time possible.
(iii) Increase access and accelerate the uptake of life-saving vaccines across the continent, including immunization, providing technical and learning assistance.
(iv) Invest in skills development programs specifically geared to creating a workforce skilled in vaccine development and manufacturing know-how.
In a similar argument, Tom Page wrote in his report, published in CNN news and newsletter, that Africa might need its own central medicines agency. The main reason is that when Africa needs medicines, the continent often looks abroad. That report, sourcing the World Economic Forum, said African nations consume about 25% of vaccines produced globally but import nearly 99% of their supply, according to the African Union Development Agency. For packaged medicines, only 36% of demand is produced locally, and just 3% is supplied by regional trade, according to the World Economic Forum.
The world acknowledges that there are people who can pay and there are people that can’t pay. It is not a sustainable model to deny people who can’t pay because they need money. Therefore, the biggest challenge is making supplies more affordable to the population. The essence of localizing production inside the continent is affordability, but there are still enormous challenges. Partly the reason why African governments should adopt a system approach and outline how to tackle health issues as fast as possible.
Today, Africa comprises 54 sovereign countries, most of which have borders that were drawn during the era of European colonialism. In the 21st century, improved stability and economic reforms have attracted a considerable great increase in foreign investment in many African nations. We hope that the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) will make cross-border trade in the pharmaceutical space easier. And there is also a lot more on the policy front from the World Trade Organization.
If vaccine manufacturing takes off with the expected speed, distribution without cut-throat customs tariffs (taxes) and through borderless countries to reach different destinations, it will ultimately ensure better healthcare delivery. At long last, the vehicle for Africa’s economic transformation has visibly arrived in the single continental market – AfCFTA and it will be a tremendous premise for achieving the health aspects of the African Union’s Agenda 2063.
By Professor Maurice Okoli is a fellow at the Institute for African Studies and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. He is also a fellow at the North-Eastern Federal University of Russia.
By Shmuel Ja’Mba Abm
In a report filed by The Business Standard on August 8, 2026, India, the current BRICS chair, opposes a proposal for a common currency to counter the US dollar.
The Indian Commerce Minister, Piyush Goyal, told reporters in Jaipur, Rajasthan, northwestern India, after a two-day BRICS trade and industry meeting, that India was not in favour of a BRICS currency. He added that India did not support the introduction of any such BRICS currency scheme.
It is good these things are showing signs at this early stage of attempts by BRICS member countries to crystallise a research finding published by a British economist at Goldman Sachs, Jim O’Neil, in 2001.
None of the leaders and country members of BRICS ever conceived on record the formation of such an economic or political bloc until the research publication, which spurred leaders of the mentioned countries to marshal resources and begin a dialogue of formalisation.
The current membership that started involuntarily with just Brazil, Russia, India, and China as a concept published by a research economist, that later included South Africa, now has 10 members – Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, United Arab Emirates, and Indonesia.
Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam are designated partner countries that participate in framework meetings without full voting rights.
Originally, the publication by Jim O’Neil wasn’t intended or proposed as a vehicle for the political grouping that has drawn the attention of the rest of the world, as mentioned members took a step further from the appraisal or assessment paper to coalesce into a political force overflowing its original boundaries today.
For the above reasons, the initial step of early contacts was to take advantage of things in common in member countries for the stimulation of economic growth and global prosperity. At that stage, suspicions were managed, and plans didn’t consider historical political differences and disagreements as grounds for suspicion or discontinuation of cooperation.
Of course, China and India had trust issues over decades of border disputes. And in the early stages of heightened escalations of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship when India offered to mediate and broker for ceasefire and eventual peace, Russia wasn’t sceptical but took steps to host the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi.
But at the back of the mind of the Russian-Indian relationship, history was revealing about betrayals, especially after what the country endured in assassinations of leading members of the Indian National Congress, that killed Indira Gandhi and swept her son, Rajiv Gandhi, and thereafter ravaged the family dynasty with threats of violence.
These paved the way for the emergence of the Bharatiya Janata Party, a Hindu nationalist party, and its leader, Narendra Modi. The BJP is not directly responsible for the intimidation and violent campaign against the INC, a close former Soviet-era ally of Russia, but a beneficiary. There are grounds to suspect a frosty relationship with Russia, although concealed in diplomatic niceties and global market dynamics of cross-border business and trade.
India turned into the redistribution hub of Russian discounted grains and oil supplies as a third country, after sanctions were imposed on Russia in what Russia described as demilitarisation and denazification special operations in Ukraine.
India is considered by Western powers as a democracy. It was once a British colony, gaining independence on August 15, 1947. It is also a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. On a normal day, it doesn’t add or take away anything. But under these circumstances, these are serious factors to consider in arriving at a decision.
Be it as it may, China and Russia have found their way out in world trade, bypassing SWIFT. China operates the Cross-border Inter-bank Payment System, whilst Russia is running the System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS). India has IMPS and NEFT. In principle, these payment systems bypass SWIFT and the US dollar, nonetheless.
As the world waits to hear India back its dissenting views with supporting facts, world trade will never remain the same again.
Shmuel Ja’Mba Abm has extensive scholarly publications that establish him as a leading academic expert in regional geopolitical dynamics and diplomatic relations in Africa. Author of e-monographs on geopolitics, ethnic conflicts, and political philosophy.
Feature/OPED
What Dangote’s Reported $40bn Private-Placement Valuation Could Mean for Nigerian Investors, NGX
Dangote Petroleum Refinery could become an unusually large part of Nigeria’s stock market if its eventual IPO valuation is close to the roughly $40 billion implied by a recent private placement.
EBC Financial Group (EBC) highlights that this would value the refinery at about N54.63 trillion, using the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Nigerian Foreign Exchange Market rate of N1,365.6856 per USD on August 7. Against the N158.513 trillion value of companies listed on the Nigerian Exchange (NGX) on the same date, adding the refinery at that value would produce a market worth about N213.14 trillion, with Dangote Refinery accounting for 25.6%.
This scenario assumes the full $40 billion equity value is reflected in NGX market capitalisation and other listed company values remain unchanged. At that size, movements in the company could become highly visible across the Nigerian equity market, although its actual influence on NGX indices may depend on the shares available for public trading and the relevant index rules.
David Precious, Senior Market Analyst at EBC Financial Group, said: “If Dangote Refinery entered the Nigerian Exchange at close to a $40 billion valuation, it could account for roughly one-quarter of the resulting NGX market value. If that valuation is difficult to support, few shares are available for public trading, or investors need to reduce other Nigerian holdings to participate, the effects could extend across Nigeria’s equity market, including existing NGX-listed companies and their shareholders.”
A Private Transaction Can Indicate Value, but Public Investors Need Financial Evidence
Based on the private transaction, $40 billion provides an indication of Dangote Refinery’s value, but it does not establish the eventual IPO price. Details published on August 4 said a $2.5 billion private placement for a 6% stake implied a valuation of roughly $40 billion. The proposed initial public offering (IPO) was reported to target about $5 billion, while the eventual IPO valuation and percentage offered to the public were not disclosed. This is important as a private transaction may produce a different valuation from the price a broad group of public investors is prepared to accept.
For context, public equity market values cited alongside the transaction were about $12 billion for Türkiye’s Tupras and $16 billion for US-listed HF Sinclair. The Dangote figure is about 3.3 times Tupras and 2.5 times HF Sinclair. They are not direct comparisons because profitability, debt, operations and growth plans differ. The gap nevertheless increases the need for audited earnings, cash flow, debt and investment plans that explain what supports the higher valuation.
The reported $5 billion fundraising target is equivalent to about N6.83 trillion at the August 7 exchange rate, or approximately 4.3% of the N158.513 trillion existing NGX market value. Proposed $5 billion raise. If new Nigerian or foreign money funds the offer, the pool of capital invested in Nigerian equities could expand. If investors sell current holdings to participate, capital could instead move away from other listed companies.
Publicly Tradable Shares and New Investment Could Shape the Wider Market Impact
NGX rules show why total company value does not tell investors how much stock they can actually trade. Main Board companies can qualify through either 20% public ownership held by at least 300 shareholders or publicly tradable shares worth at least N20 billion. The Premium Board value alternative is N40 billion. Holdings controlled by promoters, directors and close relatives, government, or strategic investors owning at least 5% are excluded from qualifying public shares.
This means a company worth tens of trillions of naira could still have a much smaller amount of stock available for regular trading if ownership remains concentrated. The key issue is therefore how much of Dangote Refinery becomes accessible to public investors and how widely those shares are held.
Regional investment could also affect the outcome. Details published on 4 August indicated engagement involving South Africa, Kenya, Egypt, Ghana and Rwanda, including possible Kenyan participation of up to $500 million, although no allocations were confirmed. The Johannesburg Stock Exchange separately said Dangote Group had shown strong intent to pursue a South African listing after Nigeria. Regional participation in the Nigerian offer could bring new capital directly into Nigerian equities. A later South African listing could broaden access but would not itself increase money raised through the Nigerian IPO.
Pension funds face the same question of capital allocation. The National Pension Commission (PenCom) waived the usual existence, profitability and dividend requirements so Pension Fund Administrators can consider the IPO, while retaining internal investment policies, risk-management requirements and duties to contributors and retirees. PenCom Circular on Dangote Refiner. PenCom states that the dispensation is exceptional, one-off and specific to this proposed IPO.
Pension funds held N5.907 trillion in domestic ordinary shares at the end of June, compared with the offer’s approximately N6.83 trillion equivalent. This does not imply pension funds would finance the offer. It shows why managers must consider exposure to one company and whether participation requires reducing other investments.
Precious added, “Dangote being listed could become a turning point for Nigeria’s equity market if it brings wider public ownership and additional African capital. Investors still need clear evidence supporting the valuation, clarity on how much of the company they can trade and an explanation of where the money raised will go. Those answers will determine whether the listing expands the Nigerian equity market or concentrates more investment around one company.”
An approved prospectus should clarify the valuation, shares offered, public ownership and use of proceeds. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) said on June 23 that no IPO application had then been filed or approved and ordered unauthorised pre-marketing to stop. Details published on 4 August later said an IPO application had been submitted, with regulatory approval expected in the following weeks. Until final terms are disclosed, the test for Nigeria is whether the listing combines a supportable valuation with broad public ownership and genuinely additional investment.
Feature/OPED
Moving the Stablecoin Conversation From Hype to Utility in Africa’s Next Payments Evolution
By Rajat Mishra
For much of the past decade, discussions around stablecoins have been dominated by cryptocurrency speculation. Increasingly, however, stablecoins are emerging as practical financial infrastructure for moving money across borders, managing liquidity and improving payment efficiency.
The real opportunity lies not in choosing between traditional finance and digital assets, but in building an integrated financial ecosystem where both work together to improve efficiency, broaden financial access and deepen economic connectivity across the continent.
Despite significant advances in financial inclusion and digital payments, moving money across African borders remains far more difficult than it should be. Businesses continue to face challenges when making cross-border payments. Fragmented payment networks, multiple intermediaries, and lengthy settlement processes increase costs and create operational inefficiencies.
Remittance providers, the specialised financial services that millions rely on to send money home, face many of the same structural challenges. These providers play a critical role across the continent. In fact, 19 of Africa’s 54 countries receive remittance inflows equivalent to at least 4% of their GDP. Yet Africa remains the world’s most expensive region to send money to.
These challenges are not a reflection of remittance providers themselves, but of the fragmented banking and settlement infrastructure underpinning international money movement. Financial institutions must often manage liquidity across multiple disconnected currency markets while relying on complex correspondent banking networks and clearing systems. The result is higher costs, slower settlements, and capital that remains unnecessarily locked up.
One of the most immediate opportunities for stablecoins lies in improving cross-border settlement. Consider a Kenyan business importing goods from South Africa. Under traditional settlement models, payments often pass through multiple correspondent banking relationships, involve several foreign exchange conversions, and can take days before funds reach the intended recipient.
Stablecoin-enabled settlement rails have the potential to reduce much of this friction by enabling value to move more efficiently between financial institutions across markets. The result can be shorter settlement times, greater transparency and improved predictability for businesses operating across borders.
The benefits extend well beyond businesses. For millions of Africans working abroad, remittances remain a financial lifeline, helping families pay school fees, healthcare costs and daily living expenses. Yet sending money home often involves navigating a complex chain of money transfer operators, correspondent banks, and local payout partners, with each additional layer introducing costs and delays.
Stablecoins can help streamline the backend movement of funds between institutional participants, reducing settlement costs and improving efficiency across the value chain.
For end users, the advantage is simplicity. Recipients do not need to interact with, or even understand stablecoins directly. They continue to receive money through familiar, trusted channels, whether a local bank account or mobile money wallet, only faster and at a lower cost.
Beyond payments, stablecoins also address one of the less visible but most significant challenges in cross-border finance: liquidity management. Financial institutions operating across multiple markets must constantly ensure they have sufficient funds in the right currency, in the right jurisdiction and at the right time. Today, this often requires pre-funding accounts across multiple countries, a costly practice that traps large amounts of capital and limits financial flexibility.
Stablecoins introduce a new model for moving value across borders in near real time, enabling institutions to manage liquidity dynamically as demand arises. This can reduce the need for large pre-funded balances, improve treasury efficiency and free up capital that can be deployed more productively. Ultimately, these efficiencies can translate into faster settlements, lower costs, and better services for businesses and consumers alike.
However, the true value of stablecoins will not come from isolated blockchain networks operating independently of existing financial systems. Their long-term impact will depend on how effectively they integrate with banks, mobile money platforms, payment service providers and existing payment infrastructure. Interoperability will be critical to ensuring payment flows move seamlessly between systems, markets and currencies. The goal should be to strengthen and modernise today’s payment ecosystem, not replace it.
From experiment to infrastructure: what global moves are telling us
Some of the clearest signals that stablecoins are moving from experimentation to infrastructure are coming from card networks. Mastercard’s reported agreement to acquire BVNK, valued at up to $1.8 billion, points to a strategic investment in the settlement layer connecting stablecoin rails with traditional banking and reflects growing institutional confidence in stablecoin-enabled cross-border payments.
Visa’s expansion of stablecoin-backed cards through Stripe’s Bridge to more than 100 countries reflects a complementary strategy. Rather than acquiring infrastructure outright, Visa is leveraging its existing global network as the final distribution layer for stablecoin-funded payments.
The inclusion of African markets is particularly significant. It signals growing confidence that stablecoin-backed payment instruments can operate alongside, and in some cases complement, the mobile money ecosystems that already dominate wallet-based payments across much of the continent.
Taken together, these developments point to a broader shift. Card payment networks are moving from observing the stablecoin conversation to investing directly in the infrastructure that underpins it. For Africa, the implication is not that stablecoins will replace existing payment rails, but that success will increasingly belong to institutions capable of orchestrating multiple settlement rails – cards, bank transfers, mobile money and stablecoins- within a unified, interoperable ecosystem. Local market expertise, regulatory relationships and last-mile distribution will remain decisive competitive advantages.
Building for scale through trust and regulation
But despite their potential, stablecoins cannot operate outside the boundaries of regulated financial systems. Their long-term viability across Africa depends on clear regulatory frameworks, robust compliance standards and trusted infrastructure that supports transparency, risk management and consumer protection.
We are already seeing this evolution. In markets such as South Africa, institutions facilitating cross-border settlements must navigate increasingly sophisticated regulatory requirements, including approvals for certain offshore crypto-related activities. Globally, initiatives such as the OECD’s Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework (CARF) and expanded Travel Rule obligations are raising expectations around reporting, tax transparency and compliance.
These developments reinforce a simple reality: stablecoin infrastructure does not reduce compliance obligations. It raises the bar for governance, transparency and institutional risk management. The objective is not to bypass regulation, but to build interoperable payment systems that can innovate confidently within it.
From the edges to the plumbing
The stablecoin conversation is steadily moving beyond speculation and towards practical implementation. What once sat at the edges of the payments debate is becoming part of the plumbing of cross-border finance rather than a parallel system to it.
The question is no longer whether stablecoins have a role to play in payments. The question is where they deliver the greatest value. In Africa, that value is increasingly clear: faster settlement, improved liquidity efficiency and more connected cross-border commerce. The winners will not be those that replace existing financial systems, but those that successfully connect stablecoin rails with the banks, mobile money networks and payment providers that already power the continent’s economy.
For pan-African payment networks such as Onafriq, the priority is ensuring that emerging technologies complement the financial infrastructure businesses and consumers already trust, rather than introducing new layers of complexity.
The opportunity lies in connecting stablecoin settlement with banks, mobile money networks and payment providers, ensuring the benefits of this new infrastructure deliver tangible outcomes for African businesses and consumers.
Rajat Mishra is the CPO for Network Product & Deputy Group CPIO at Onafriq
