Feature/OPED
Alliance of Sahel States: Beginner’s Guide
By Professor Maurice Okoli
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, the three Francophone West African countries under military government, have established an Alliance of Sahel States (AES, or Alliance des Etats du Sahel in French), which is a confederation formed between the above-mentioned three countries.
It originated as a mutual defence pact and was created by the three countries on September 16, 2023. The confederation was officially established on July 6, 2024. The AES is anti-French and anti-ECOWAS in outlook. All three member states of the AES have had their pro-Western governments overthrown by their militaries, and each is currently ruled by a military junta as part of the coup belt.
In 2002, Mali withdrew from the internationally backed G5 Sahel alliance, and Niger and Burkina Faso followed suit in 2023. This led to the dissolution of the G5 framework by its last two members, Chad and Mauritania. The AES has finally exited the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
In addition to their enthusiasm to ensure long-term political power, the three have generally joined a growing list of African countries that are turning their economies into better environments for their millions of impoverished citizens.
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, in early July 2024, finally withdrew from the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and have further taken the next collective step to create their own sub-regional bloc referred to as the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
The treaty underscores a “step towards greater integration” between the signatory countries. The pact is open to new members in the event that the candidate accepts all provisions and the ‘trio’ unanimously agrees on the decision.
In practical terms, the trio has repeatedly explained the primary reasons for the joint action as follows: (i) the AU and the ECOWAS’s significant failure to provide adequate support against fighting the jihadists; (ii) the imposition of ‘illegal sanctions’ that are harming the people; and (iii) that the bloc has fallen under the influence of and indiscriminately manipulated by foreign governments, particularly France. (iv) ECOWAS threatens to intervene to restore civilian rule in Niger.
The Alliance further seeks new members whose political philosophy aligns with the current development challenges. The new confederation’s document outlines various directions on its agenda, including establishing a regional bank and stabilisation fund. It has also issued an executive order to facilitate foreign investment in their territorial space.
The document clip circulated widely on social media, racking up thousands of views and introducing fresh debate around the fact that the former political system was stacked with bureaucracy and conservative policy.
A curious look inside the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States has been making resonating waves. The architects of this alliance, both online and offline, have accordingly been pushing the agenda. The Blueprint Document is open to the public and foreign organisations, the regional bloc ECOWAS, and the continental organisation AU.
Reports have indicated that the inaugural meeting was held on July 6 in Niamey, the capital of Niger, and was attended by President of Burkina Faso Ibrahim Traoré, Transitional President of the Republic of Mali Assimi Goita, and President of Niger’s National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland, Abdourahamane Tchiani.
The Niamey Declaration, in which the ‘trio’ formally announced the establishment of the new confederation,’s primary multifaceted goals include consolidating joint efforts to ensure security and address the socioeconomic problems of the participating states. The alliance will also pursue and undertake joint development projects as well as address questions relating to trade, industry, and agriculture. The document holds the promise to facilitate the free movement of people, goods, and services.
The Alliance of Sahel States is resonating across the sub-region, across Africa, and beyond. Critics have labelled it a real ‘threat to democracy’ and a step to assert ‘an authoritarian’ takeover of political power and administration, while supporters call it a strategic plan to establish power as one ‘of the people, by the people, and for the people, and probably the irreversible beginning of an end of epoch, 500 years of colonialism.
The Alliance of Sahel States came under the spotlight after their July declaration. As expected in the context of the geopolitical situation and analysing the background of the complexities of the evolving political situation, especially in West Africa, it is very noticeable that the United States, Europe, and a few other external powers have stood on the opposite side.
On the other side, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in its weekly media briefing that while consistently advocating for ‘African solutions to African problems’, the initiative by the leaders of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger fully meets the interests of the people of those countries. “We are confident that the Alliance of Sahel States will facilitate the formation of a new regional security architecture. Russia reaffirms its intention to continue to provide the necessary support to the countries of the Alliance of Sahel States,” the report said.
In another related development, Mali’s military leader, Assimi Goita, had spoken by phone with Russian President Vladimir Putin about political developments and his approach to settling the crisis in the region as a whole. Putin stressed “the importance of a peaceful resolution of the situation for a more stable Sahel,” according to the transcript posted to the Kremlin’s website.
Most probably, ECOWAS is now crumbling due to institutional weaknesses combined with being manipulated by external forces. There has been rising anti-western sentiment in the former French colonies. It is also due to the long-standing discontent with and the inability to support effectively in the fight against growing insecurity in the region. Reports say ECOWAS has been working to set up a standing regional force of between 1,500 and 5,000 soldiers, which reports estimate would cost about $2.6bn (£2bn) annually.
But for political observers, their split from ECOWAS comes with many potential ramifications, ranging from economics to security. Buchanan Ismael, a politics professor at the University of Rwanda, believes it “may increase the risk of insecurity” in an already volatile region infested with militant groups.
Hassan Isilow, a political analyst, says in his report that Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have cemented their split from ECOWAS and formed their own Alliance of Sahel States.
The West Africa region could be headed for ‘foreign-imposed instability,’ warns the University of South Africa’s Ahmed Jazbhay.
More countries could’separate themselves from ECOWAS, if not through coups, then with anti-Western populists,’ says Rwanda-based analyst Buchanan Ismael.
The fact is that the common theme in their statements was greater integration between their countries—the majority of African states that have slowly but surely been drifting away from traditional regional and Western allies.
Research reports published by The Conversation, Agence France Press, British Broadcasting, and many other reputable media indicated that the unilateral withdrawal of three West African countries would be hit by trade regulations and restrictions, thus impacting the population and the economy.
The three are landlocked and among the poorest in the world; this already illustrates their major disadvantage and limited position. Several narratives further pointed to the fundamental fact that the crisis has the potential to escalate into either a conflict across West Africa or the final disintegration of ECOWAS.
In July 2024, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger signed a confederation security pact and formalised their final exit from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the regional bloc that imposed sanctions on them after the coups in Mali in 2020, Burkina Faso in 2022, and Niger in 2023.
“This summit marks a decisive step for the future of our common space. Together, we will consolidate the foundations of our true independence, a guarantee of true peace and sustainable development, through the creation of the ‘Alliance of the Sahel States’ Confederation,” Traore said in a statement posted on X.
By creating their own Alliance of Sahel States, it exposes the regional bloc ECOWAS and the continental organisation AU’s powerlessness, multitude of weaknesses, and long-term inability and incompetency to deal with regional problems through mediation.
In the ECOWAS guidelines, Article 91 of the bloc’s treaty stipulates that member countries remain bound by their obligations for a period of one year after notification of their withdrawal. For better or for worse, these interim military governments have adopted a hardline stance, consistently delaying fixing concrete dates to hold democratic elections.
The AU Commission chief, Moussa Faki Mahamat, repainted the ‘bleak picture’ with a ‘litany of difficulties’ confronting many African countries during the 37th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU) summit held, from February 14 to February 15, at the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. AUC chief Moussa Faki Mahamat assertively spoke of ‘worrying trends’ in North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and also in West Africa.
Moussa Faki Mahamat blasted the failure to counter multiple “unconstitutional changes of government” following a string of coups in West Africa and warned the scourge of “terrorism” was diverting money away from vital social needs to military spending. In practical reality, the summit was now concerned about looking inward, closely protecting their sovereign prerogatives rather than investing in collective security, somehow to fund most of its budget rather than foreign donors. Gabon and Niger were absent from the summit following their suspension over coups last year, joining Mali, Guinea, Sudan, and Burkina Faso, which are also barred for similar reasons.
As an expert in geopolitics and regional economic integration, it is important to take a close look at the possible obvious implications. Despite taking this innovative step, there are still obstacles and explicit challenges in the areas of coordination and cooperation. For instance, the fact that the three are geographically landlocked stipulates the questions of access to the coastline, logistics, and delivery of goods through seaports.
The next question that cannot be overemphasised is whether Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union, which uses the CFA franc as its common currency. The trio has to create their own currency if they are expelled from the West African Economic and Monetary Union.
Usually referred to as the West African Sahel, it is the vast semi-arid region where Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and other countries are located. This West African Sahel region has been plagued by security challenges, including terrorism and organised crime. Terrorist organisations such as Boko Haram, the Islamic State, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have operated in the Sahel, exacerbating violence, extremism, and instability in the region.
According to the latest issue of the Global Terrorism Index, there is a strong link between organised crime and terrorism in this region. Terrorism is on the rise, and the Sahel accounts for almost half of all deaths from terrorism globally.
This is further exacerbated by the cross-border operations of armed groups and rising violent extremism. That, combined with widespread and growing desertification, contributes additional strain to the region’s development. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have a combined population of approximately 80 million people and some of the fastest population growth rates in the world. But development has been assessed as poor, far below what is needed to guarantee a normal living standard.
In addition to insecurity and instability, these countries are engulfed in various socio-economic problems combined with traditional cultural practices that have lessened development. The system of governance and poor policies largely hinder sustainable development.
In light of the above, ECOWAS will have to adapt its strategy to this new geopolitical reality. The AES could seek to establish or strengthen its partnerships with other international actors, such as Russia or China, of the multipolar BRICS Alliance, which have shown growing interest in Africa.
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger together comprise some 72 million people, almost a fifth of the regional bloc’s population. It remains one of the least developed countries in the world, with a GDP of $16.23 billion in 2022. Geography and the environment contribute to Burkina Faso’s food insecurity.
Mali’s key industry is agriculture. Cotton is the country’s largest crop export and is exported west throughout Senegal and Ivory Coast. Gold is mined in the southern region, and Mali has the third-highest gold production in Africa (after South Africa and Ghana).
Niger is the second-largest landlocked nation in Africa, behind Chad. Over 80% of its land area lies in the Sahara. In 2021, Niger was the main supplier of uranium to the EU, followed by Kazakhstan and Russia. Despite its large deposit of uranium, Niger has a multidimensional underdevelopment, and 80% of its citizens consistently live in abject poverty.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) continues to look for appropriate mechanisms to resolve the ongoing crisis. The regional bloc has come under persistent criticism; it has slackened on its primary responsibilities, while some have called for drastic reforms and personnel changes (overhauling or restructuring), attributing to the complete inefficiency of the organisation.
Consisting of 15 member states, ECOWAS facilitates peacekeeping through systematic collaboration with civil society, cooperation with development policies, and other activities to meet sub-regional security challenges. Established on May 28, 1975, the bloc’s reputation has been at stake and most probably needs new dynamic faces at the Secretariat in Abuja, Nigeria.
Professor Maurice Okoli is a fellow at the Institute for African Studies and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. He is also a fellow at the North-Eastern Federal University of Russia. He is an expert at the Roscongress Foundation and the Valdai Discussion Club.
As an academic researcher and economist with a keen interest in current geopolitical changes and the emerging world order, Maurice Okoli frequently contributes articles for publication in reputable media portals on different aspects of the interconnection between developing and developed countries, particularly in Asia, Africa, and Europe. With comments and suggestions, he can be reached via email: markolconsult (at) gmail (dot) com.
Feature/OPED
Dangote, Monopoly Power, and Political Economy of Failure
By Blaise Udunze
Nigeria’s refining crisis is one of the country’s most enduring economic contradictions. Africa’s largest crude oil producer, strategically located on the Atlantic coast and home to over 200 million people, has for decades depended on imported refined petroleum products. This illogicality has drained foreign exchange, weakened the naira, distorted investment incentives, and hollowed out state institutions. Instead of catalysing industrialisation, Nigeria’s oil wealth became a mechanism for capital flight, rent-seeking, and institutional decay.
With the challenges surrounding the refining of crude oil, the establishment of Dangote Refinery signifies an important historic moment. The refinery promises to reduce fuel imports to a bare minimum, sustain foreign exchange growth, ensure there is constant fuel domestically, and strategically position Nigeria as a regional exporter of refined oil products if functioned at full capacity. Dangote Refinery symbolises what private capital, technology, and ambition can achieve in Africa following years of fuel queues, subsidy scandals, and global embarrassment.
Nigerians must have a rethink in the cause of celebration. Nigeria’s refining problem is not simply about capacity; it is about systems. Without addressing the policy failures and institutional weaknesses that made Dangote an exception rather than the rule, the country risks replacing one failure with another, this time cloaked in private-sector success.
For a fact, Nigeria desperately needs the emergence of Dangote refinery, and its success is in the national interest. Hence, this is not an argument against the Dangote Refinery. But history warns that structural failures are not solved by scale alone. Over the year, situations have shown that without competition and strong institutions, concentrated market power, whether public or private, can undermine price stability, energy security, and consumer welfare.
The Long Silence of Refinery Investments
Perhaps the most troubling question in Nigeria’s oil history is why none of the global oil majors like Shell, ExxonMobil, Chevron, Total, or Agip has built a major refinery in Nigeria for over four decades. These companies operated profitably in Nigeria, extracted their crude, and sold refined products back to the country, yet never committed capital to domestic refining.
Over the period, it has been shown that policy incoherence has been the cause, not a matter of technical incapacity, such as price controls, resistant licensing processes, subsidy arrears, frequent regulatory changes, and political interference, which made refining an unattractive investment. Importation, by contrast, offered quick returns, lower political risk, and guaranteed margins, often backed by government subsidies.
Nigeria carelessly designed a system that rather rewarded importers and punished refiners. Dangote did not succeed because the system improved; he succeeded despite it. His refinery exists largely because of the concessions from the government, exceptional financial capacity, political access, and a willingness to absorb risks that institutions should ordinarily mitigate. This raises a deeper concern; when institutions fail, progress becomes dependent on extraordinary individuals rather than predictable systems.
The Tragedy of NNPC Refineries
If private investors stayed away, Nigeria’s state-owned refineries should have filled the gap. Instead, the Port Harcourt, Warri, and Kaduna refineries became monuments to mismanagement. Records have shown that between 2010 and 2025, Nigeria reportedly wasted between $18 billion and $25 billion, over N11 trillion, just for Turn Around Maintenance and rehabilitation. Kaduna Refinery alone is estimated to have consumed over N2.2 trillion in a decade.
Despite these expenditures, output remained negligible. This was not merely a technical failure but a governance one. Contracts were poorly monitored, accountability was absent, and consequences were nonexistent. In functional systems, such outcomes trigger investigations, sanctions, and reforms. In Nigeria, the cycle simply repeated itself, eroding public trust and deepening dependence on imports.
Where Is BUA?
Dangote is not the only Nigerian conglomerate to announce refinery ambitions. In 2020, BUA Group unveiled plans for a 200,000-barrels-per-day refinery. Years later, progress remains unclear, timelines have shifted, and execution appears stalled.
This pattern is revealing. When multiple large investors struggle to translate plans into reality, the issue is not ambition but environment. Refinery projects in Nigeria appear viable only at a massive scale and with extraordinary political leverage. Smaller or mid-sized players are effectively crowded out, not by market forces, but by systemic dysfunction.
Policy Failure and the Singapore Comparison
Nigeria often aspires to emulate Singapore’s refining and petrochemical success. The comparison is instructive. Singapore has no crude oil, yet built one of the world’s most sophisticated refining hubs through consistent policy, investor protection, infrastructure planning, and regulatory certainty.
Nigeria chose a different path: price controls, subsidies, weak contract enforcement, and politically motivated policy reversals. Refineries became tools of patronage rather than productivity. Capital exited, infrastructure decayed, and import dependence deepened. The outcome was predictable.
The Cost of Import Dependence
For years, Nigeria spent billions of dollars annually importing petrol, diesel, and aviation fuel. This placed constant pressure on foreign reserves and the naira. Petrol subsidies alone were estimated at N4-N6 trillion per year, often exceeding national spending on health, education, or infrastructure.
Even after subsidy removal, legacy costs remain: distorted consumption patterns, weakened public finances, and entrenched interests built around importation. These interests did not disappear quietly.
Who Really Benefited from the Subsidy?
Although framed as pro-poor, fuel subsidies disproportionately benefited importers, traders, shipping firms, depot owners, financiers, and politically connected intermediaries. Smuggling across borders meant Nigerians subsidised fuel consumption in neighbouring countries.
Ordinary citizens received marginal relief at the pump but paid far more through inflation, deteriorating infrastructure, and underfunded public services. The subsidy system functioned less as social protection and more as elite redistribution.
The Traders’ Dilemma
Why did major fuel marketers like Oando invest in refineries abroad but not in Nigeria? Again, incentives explain behaviour. Importation offered faster returns, lower capital requirements, and political insulation. Domestic refining demanded long-term investment under unstable rules.
In an irrational system, rational actors optimise accordingly. Importation thrived not because it was efficient, but because policy made it so.
FDI and the Confidence Problem
Sustainable Foreign Direct Investment follows domestic confidence. When local investors, who best understand political and regulatory risks, avoid long-term industrial projects, foreign investors take note. Capital flows to environments with predictable pricing, rule of law, and policy consistency.
Nigeria’s challenge is not attracting speculative capital, but building conditions for patient, productive investment.
Dangote and the Monopoly Question
Dangote Refinery deserves credit. But scale brings power, and power demands oversight. If importers exit and no competing refineries emerge, Dangote could dominate refining, pricing, and supply. Nigeria’s experience with cement, where domestic production rose but prices soared due to limited competition, offers a cautionary tale.
Markets function best with competition. Without it, price manipulation, supply risks, and weakened energy security become real dangers, especially in countries with fragile regulatory institutions.
The Way Forward: Competition, Not Replacement
Nigeria does not need to weaken Dangote; it needs to multiply Dangotes. The goal should be a competitive refining ecosystem, not a replacement of a public monopoly with a private monopoly.
This requires transparent crude allocation, open access to pipelines and storage, fair pricing mechanisms, and strong antitrust enforcement. State refineries must either be professionally concessional or decisively restructured. Stalled projects like BUA’s should be unblocked, and modular refineries should be supported.
The Litmus Test
Nigeria’s refining crisis was decades in the making and cannot be solved by one refinery, however large. Dangote Refinery is a turning point, but only if embedded within systemic reform. Otherwise, Nigeria risks trading one form of dependency for another.
The true test is not whether Nigeria can refine fuel, but whether it can build fair, open, and resilient institutions that serve the public interest. In refining, as in democracy, excessive concentration of power is dangerous. Competition remains the strongest safeguard.
Blaise, a journalist and PR professional, writes from Lagos and can be reached via: [email protected]
Feature/OPED
How AI Levels the Playing Field for SMEs
By Linda Saunders
Intro: In many small businesses, the owner often starts out as the bookkeeper, the customer-service desk, the IT technician and the person who steps in when a delivery goes wrong. With so many balls up in the air – and such little room for error – one dropped ball can derail the entire day and trigger a chain of problems that’s hard to recover from. Unlike larger companies that have the luxury of spreading the load across dedicated teams and systems, SMEs carry it all on a few shoulders.
South Africa’s SME sector carries significant weight, contributing around 19% of GDP and a third of formal employment, according to the latest available Trade & Industrial Policy Strategies (TIPS) 2024 review. That is causing persistent constraints, including tight margins, erratic demand, high administrative load, and limited internal capacity.
This is not unique to South Africa. Many smaller businesses across the continent still rely on manual processes. It is common to find sales records kept separately from customer notes, or inventory data that is updated only occasionally. The result is slow turnaround times, duplicated effort and a lack of visibility across the business. Given that SMEs have such a huge influence on national economies, accounting for over 90% of all businesses, between 20-40% of GDP in some African countries, and a major source of employment, providing around 80% of jobs, these operational constraints have a broad impact on economies.
What has changed in recent years is that digital tools once seen as the preserve of larger companies have become more attainable for smaller operators. They do not remove the structural challenges SMEs face, but they can ease the load. Better systems do not replace judgement, experience or customer relationships; they simply give small companies more room to work with.
Cloud-based systems, automation and integrated customer-management tools have become more affordable and easier to deploy. They do not remove the structural pressures facing small businesses, but they can ease the operational load and create more space for productive work.
Doing more with the teams SMEs already have
Small teams often end up wearing several hats. One person might take customer calls, update stock records, handle service issues and manage follow-ups. When demand rises, these manual processes become harder to sustain. Local surveys regularly point to this strain, showing that smaller companies spend significant portions of the week on paperwork, compliance and routine administrative tasks – work that adds little value but cannot be ignored.
This is where automation is proving useful. Routine tasks such as onboarding new customers, checking documents, routing queries to the right person, logging interactions and sending follow-ups can now run quietly in the background. In larger companies, whole departments handle this work. In small businesses, the same burden has traditionally fallen on one or two people. When these processes run reliably without constant attention, a business with 10 employees can manage busier periods without rushed outsourcing or slipping service standards.
The point is not to replace staff, but to reduce the operational drag that limits what small teams can deliver. Structured workflows give SMEs a level of steadiness they have rarely had the time or money to build themselves.
Using better data to make better decisions
A second constraint facing SMEs is disorganised information. When customer details are lost in email, sales notes in chat groups, stock figures in spreadsheets and queries in separate systems, decisions depend on whatever information happens to be at hand. Forecasting becomes guesswork, and early warning signs are easy to miss.
Putting all this information in a single place changes the quality of decision-making. When sales, service and stock data can be viewed together, patterns become easier to spot: which products are moving, which customers are becoming less active, where delays tend to occur, and which periods consistently drive higher demand.
Importantly, SMEs do not need corporate analytics teams for this. Modern CRM platforms can organise information automatically and surface basic trends. For retailers preparing for 2026, this can help avoid over – or under – stocking. For service businesses, it can highlight customers who may be at risk of leaving, prompting earlier intervention. In competitive markets, having clearer information is a practical advantage.
Building a foundation before the pressure arrives
Rapid growth can be as destabilising for SMEs as an economic downturn. When orders increase, manual processes quickly reach their limit. Errors are more likely, staff become overwhelmed and the customer experience suffers. Many small businesses only upgrade their systems once these problems appear, by which time the cost, both financial and reputational, is already significant.
Putting basic workflow tools and a unified customer record in place early provides a useful buffer. Tasks follow the same steps every time, reducing inconsistency. Customers reach the right person more quickly. Staff spend less time checking or re-entering information and more time on work that matters. These small operational gains compound over time, especially during busy periods.
This is not about chasing every new technology. It is about avoiding a common pattern in the SME sector: when demand rises, systems buckle, and growth becomes more difficult.
Confidence matters as much as capability
Smaller companies understandably worry about risk when adopting new systems. Data protection, monitoring, and compliance can feel daunting without an IT department. The advantage of modern platforms is that many of these protections, like encryption, audit trails, and event monitoring, are built in. Transparent design also helps SMEs understand how automated decisions are made and how customer data is handled.
This reassurance is important because SMEs should not have to choose between improving their operations and protecting their customers’ information.
2026 will reward readiness
Technology will not replace the qualities that give SMEs their edge: personal service, flexibility, and the ability to respond quickly to customer needs. What it can do is relieve the administrative load that prevents those strengths from being fully used.
SMEs that invest in simple automation and better data practices now will enter 2026 with greater capacity and clearer insight. They won’t be competing with larger companies by matching their resources, but by removing the disadvantages that have traditionally held them back.
In the year ahead, the most competitive businesses will not be the biggest; they’ll be the ones that prepared early for the year ahead.
Linda Saunders is the Country Manager & Senior Director Solution Engineering for Africa at Salesforce
Feature/OPED
Why Africa Requires Homegrown Trade Finance to Boost Economic Integration
By Cyprian Rono
Africa’s quest to trade with itself has never been more urgent. With the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) gaining momentum, governments are working to deepen intra-African commerce. The idea of “One African Market” is no longer aspirational; it is emerging as a strategic pathway for economic growth, job creation, and industrial competitiveness. Yet even as infrastructure and regulatory reforms advance, one fundamental question remains; how will Africa finance its cross-border trade, across markets with diverse currencies, regulations, and standards?
Today, only 15 to 18 percent of Africa’s internal trade happens within the continent, compared to 68 percent in Europe and 59 percent in Asia. Closing this gap is essential if AfCFTA is to deliver prosperity to Africa’s 1.3 billion people.
A major constraint is the continent’s huge trade finance deficit, which exceeds USD 81 billion annually, according to the African Development Bank. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which provide more than 80 percent of the continent’s jobs, are the most affected. Many struggle with insufficient collateral, stringent risk profiling and compliance requirements that mirror international banking standards rather than the realities of African business.
To build integrated value chains, exporters and importers must operate within trusted, predictable, and interconnected financial systems. This requires strong pan-African financial institutions with both local knowledge and continental reach.
Homegrown trade finance is therefore indispensable. Pan-African banks combine deep domestic roots with extensive regional reach, making them the most credible engines for financing trade integration. By retaining financial activity within the continent, homegrown lenders reduce exposure to external shocks and keep liquidity circulating locally. They also strengthen existing regional payment infrastructure such as the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS), developed by the Africa Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) and backed by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Secretariat, enabling faster, cheaper and seamless cross-border payments across the continent.
Digital transformation amplifies this advantage. Real-time payments, seamless Know-Your-Customer (KYC) verification, automated credit scoring and consistent service delivery across markets are essential for intra-African trade. Institutions such as Ecobank, operating in 34 African countries with integrated core banking systems, demonstrate how such digital ecosystems can enable continent-wide commerce.
Platforms such as Ecobank’s Omni, Rapidtransfer and RapidCollect, together with digital account-opening services, make it much easier for traders to operate across borders. Rapidtransfer enables instant, secure payments across Ecobank’s 34-country network, reducing delays in regional trade, while RapidCollect gives cross-border enterprises the ability to receive payments from multiple African countries into a single account with real-time confirmation and automated reconciliation. Together, these solutions create an integrated digital ecosystem that lowers friction, accelerates payments, and strengthens intra-African commerce.
Trust, however, remains a significant barrier. Cross-border commerce depends on the confidence that partners will honour contracts, deliver goods as promised, pay on time, and present authentic documentation. Traders often lack reliable information on potential partners, operate under different regulatory regimes, and exchange documents that are difficult to verify across borders. This heightens the risk of fraud, non-payment, and contractual disputes, discouraging businesss from expanding beyond familiar markets.
Technology is closing this trust gap. Artificial Intelligence enables lenders to assess risk using alternative data for SMEs without formal credit histories. Distributed ledger tools make shipping documents, certificates of origin, and inspection reports tamper-proof. In addition, supply-chain visibility platforms enable real-time tracking of goods and cross-border digital KYC ensures that both buyers and sellers are verified before any transaction occurs.
Ecobank’s Single Trade Hub embodies this trust infrastructure by offering a secure digital marketplace where buyers and sellers can trade with confidence, even in markets where no prior relationships exist. The platform’s Trade Intelligence suite provides customers instant access to market data from customs information and product classification tools across 133 countries.
Through its unique features such as the classification of best import/export markets, over 25,000 market and industry reports, customs duty calculators, and local and universal customs classification codes, businesses can accurately assess market opportunities, anticipate trends, reduce compliance risks, and optimise supply chains, ultimately helping them compete and grow in regional and global markets.
SMEs need more than financing. Many operate in cash-heavy cycles where suppliers and logistics providers require upfront payment. Lenders can support these businesses with advisory services, business intelligence, compliance guidance, and platforms for secure partner verification, contract negotiation, and secure settlement of payments. Trade fairs, industry forums, and partnerships with chambers of commerce further build the trust networks needed for cross-border trade.
Ultimately, Africa’s path toward meaningful trade integration begins with financial integration. AfCFTA’s promise will only be realised when enterprises can trade with confidence, knowing that payments will be honoured, partners verified, and disputes resolved. This requires collaboration between banks, regulators, and trade institutions, alongside harmonised financial regulations, interoperable payment systems, and continent-wide verification networks.
Africa can no longer rely on external actors to finance its trade. Its economic transformation depends on strong, trusted, and digitally enabled African financial institutions that understand Africa’s unique risks and opportunities. By building an African-led trade finance ecosystem, the continent can unlock liquidity, reduce dependence on external currencies, empower SMEs, and retain more value locally. Africa’s trade revolution will accelerate when its financing is driven by African institutions, African systems, and African ambition.
Cyprian Rono is the Director of Corporate and Investment Banking for Kenya and EAC at Ecobank Kenya
-
Feature/OPED6 years agoDavos was Different this year
-
Travel/Tourism9 years ago
Lagos Seals Western Lodge Hotel In Ikorodu
-
Showbiz3 years agoEstranged Lover Releases Videos of Empress Njamah Bathing
-
Banking7 years agoSort Codes of GTBank Branches in Nigeria
-
Economy3 years agoSubsidy Removal: CNG at N130 Per Litre Cheaper Than Petrol—IPMAN
-
Banking3 years agoFirst Bank Announces Planned Downtime
-
Banking3 years agoSort Codes of UBA Branches in Nigeria
-
Sports3 years agoHighest Paid Nigerian Footballer – How Much Do Nigerian Footballers Earn











